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I. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary international lawmaking is characterized by the rapid
growth of new “soft law” instruments and a decline in the conclusion of
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new treaties.1 The future of customary international law (CIL) in this
changing landscape is unclear. This uncertainty is reflected in the bur-
geoning interdisciplinary literature on legalized international cooperation.
Scholars have scrutinized the design of international agreements, as
well as the relationship between soft law and treaties. To a large extent,
they have framed their inquiries in terms of when states choose particular
treaty design features or instead opt for nonbinding forms of legal cooper-
ation. But these studies focus on only one form of hard law—treaties—
and cooperation through formal international institutions. Far less atten-
tion has been paid to custom, the other traditional form of binding inter-
national law.2 Other scholars have dismissed CIL as increasingly
irrelevant,3 in part because treaties have codified many legal rules that
were traditionally regulated by custom,4 in part because treaties offer pu-
tative advantages over custom, such as precision in language,5 and in part
because custom is plagued by doctrinal confusion.6 Absent from these
studies is any discussion of whether—and under what circumstances—
states might actually prefer custom over treaties or soft law. This article
1. See Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law As Foreign Relations Law, 99 COR-
NELL L. REV. 735, 745–55 (2014); Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel & Jan Wouters, When
Structures Become Shackles: Stagnation and Dynamics in International Lawmaking, 25 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 733 (2014); Harold Hongju Koh, Remarks: Twenty-First-Century International
Lawmaking, 101 GEO. L.J. 725, 740–46 (2013).
2. A recent stocktaking of two decades of international law and international rela-
tions scholarship highlights the “persistent neglect” of custom as a “manifest weakness” of
the field as a whole. Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, Reviewing Two Decades of IL/IR
Scholarship: What We’ve Learned, What’s Next, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 175 (Jeffrey
L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013) [hereinafter INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES].
3. See Andrew T. Guzman & Jerome Hsiang, Reinvigorating Customary International
Law, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 275 (Curtis A.
Bradley ed., 2016) [hereinafter CUSTOM’S FUTURE] (“For decades now, some legal commen-
tators have suggested that customary international law (CIL) is dying. Looking out at the
world, one might be excused for agreeing with them.”); J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of
Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 452 (2000) (arguing that the customary
international law is on the decline); but see Jose´ E. Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 17, 20 (2009) [hereinafter Alvarez, A Bit on Custom] (arguing that “the
rumored ‘demise’ of non-treaty sources of international law has been vastly exaggerated”).
4. See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, The Growing Obsolescence of Customary International
Law, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE, supra note 3, at 172.
5. See Timothy Meyer, Codifying Custom, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 995, 1000 (2012) [here-
inafter Meyer, Codifying Custom] (“[C]odification allows states to specify more precisely
what customary international law requires, thereby facilitating deeper cooperation and
avoiding costly disputes over vague legal rules.”); SERGE SUR, INTERNATIONAL LAW, POWER,
SECURITY AND JUSTICE 171 (2010) (“Nowadays there is a tendency to mistrust custom be-
cause of its imprecision. . . . Does not [the] remarkable growth of treaties, the servant of
international law, slowly lead custom down the path to comfortable retirement?”).
6. The International Law Commission has recently embarked upon an effort to clar-
ify many of the doctrinal rules governing custom. See Sir Michael Wood (Special Rap-
porteur), Third Report on Identification of Customary International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
682 (Mar. 27, 2015).
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fills that gap in the literature, offering an instrument choice perspective on
CIL.
Scholars who employ a rational choice paradigm have devoted signifi-
cant attention to both treaties and nonbinding norms, and to their interre-
lationship. In the realm of treaties, studies have analyzed many aspects of
the design of international agreements, from the relationship between
treaty form and substance, to the institutions and monitoring mechanisms
that treaties create, to the flexibility tools that negotiators use to manage
the risks of treaty-based cooperation.7 A different strand of rationalist
scholarship explains when and why states choose nonbinding norms and
the tradeoffs between soft and hard law. These studies measure “legaliza-
tion” not as a binary choice, but as a continuum measured by the degrees
of obligation, precision and delegation in the arrangements that states ne-
gotiate.8 Scholars using this legalization framework have examined the
often complex relationship between binding and nonbinding instruments
in issue areas including security, environmental protection, trade, and the
regulation of transnational corporations.9
A core contribution that links these studies is their focus on instru-
ment choice.10 An instrument choice framework assumes that rational
states choose the type of legalized cooperation—and the norms and design
features associated with it—that furthers their own interests. Although
some versions of the framework assume that nations only pursue short-
term material gains, more capacious and realistic approaches are fully
compatible with the claim that states select legal instruments and their de-
sign attributes to advance a long-term preference for upholding interna-
tional commitments.
7. See, e.g., BARBARA KOREMENOS, THE CONTINENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: EX-
PLAINING AGREEMENT DESIGN 99–192 (forthcoming 2016); Andrew T. Guzman, The Design
of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 579, 581–82 (2005); Barbara Koremenos,
Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 INT’L
ORG. 761, 762 (2001) [hereinafter Koremenos, Lipson & Snidal, Rational Design of Interna-
tional Institutions]; Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J.
INT’L L. 581, 582 (2005); Laurence R. Helfer, Flexibility in International Agreements, in IN-
TERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 176–79.
8. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in Interna-
tional Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 421–22 (2000).
9. See, e.g., ANDREW T. GUZMAN & TIMOTHY L. MEYER, GOLDILOCKS GLOBALISM:
THE RISE OF SOFT LAW IN INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE (forthcoming 2016); Gregory C.
Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard Versus Soft Law in International Security, 52 BOS. C. L.
REV. 1147, 1149–50 (2011); Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alter-
natives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706,
753–98 (2010); Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 171, 173 (2010); Harri Kalimo & Tim Staal, “Softness” in International Instru-
ments—The Case of Transnational Corporations, 41 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 257, 262
(2014); Jon Birger Skjærseth et al., Soft Law, Hard Law, and Effective Implementation of
International Environmental Norms, 6 GLOB. ENVTL. POL. 104, 105–06 (2006).
10. For an early and influential discussion of instrument choice in international coop-
eration, see Jonathan B. Weiner, Global Environmental Regulations: Instrument Choice in
Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 704–09 (1999).
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Strikingly, however, the rational design, legalization, and instrument
choice scholarship has all but ignored CIL. Numerous studies of interna-
tional lawmaking barely mention custom, lump it together with soft law, or
view it as a less binding form of commitment than treaties.11 More specifi-
cally, these accounts fail to consider the distinctive design features of CIL
or whether and when states might choose custom as their preferred legal
instrument.12
An instrument choice perspective offers three interrelated insights
that reveal custom’s continuing relevance to contemporary international
lawmaking. First, the perspective identifies the distinctive design elements
that distinguish CIL from treaties and soft law. Second, instrument choice
illuminates the constraints that limit states’ use of custom to particular
types of cooperation problems. And third, the approach predicts that
states, in these constraints, will continue to prefer custom over treaties and
soft law when custom’s design features or its substantive norms offer ad-
vantages over treaties or soft law.
Before proceeding, we offer a few qualifications and caveats. First, in
line with standard rationalist accounts of international cooperation, we
view states as the primary actors. This does not imply that the individuals
and institutions within states—executive branch officials, legislatures, civil
society groups, and so forth—do not influence the selection of custom
over treaties or soft law. Our focus, however, is on the dynamics of instru-
ment choice at an international level, where the preferences of these ac-
tors have been aggregated and incorporated into the positions states adopt
11. See, e.g., Andrew Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 115, 119 (2005) (asking whether CIL is irrelevant today because “modern international
relations have made the treaty a more important tool, relative to CIL, than it has been in the
past, and there are myriad ways for states to cooperate through soft law instruments that fall
short of treaties”); Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKE L.J. 559, 621 (2002)
(“[C]ustomary international law, like informal agreements, may allow states a relatively mod-
erate means of credibly committing themselves, while at the same time permitting less costly
escape when the circumstances demand it.”); Barbara Koremenos et al., Rational Design:
Looking Back to Move Forward, 55 INT’L ORG. 1051, 1078 (2001) (noting that the editors of
a special issue on rational design refer to CIL only to note that custom should be codified “to
make it more precise and to ensure that the expectations it entails are widely understood”);
Hiram Chodosh, An Interpretive Theory of International Law: The Distinction Between
Treaty and Customary Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 973, 1012 (1995) (questioning
whether custom is a form of soft law).
12. A partial exception is Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Erik Voeten, Precedent, Compli-
ance and Change in Customary International Law: An Explanatory Theory, 108 AM. J. INT’L
L. 389, 395–401 (2014). Verdier and Voeten develop a positive theory of how CIL changes
over time, but do not explain, as we do in this article, whether and why states choose custom
over treaties or soft law. A few other scholars have applied a rational choice approach to
custom, primarily focusing on the issue of state compliance with CIL. See generally JACK L.
GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); Guzman, Sav-
ing Customary International Law, supra note 11; George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The
Customary International Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 541, 543 (2005); Swaine, supra note
11. These scholars have not considered custom’s distinctive design features, nor applied an
instrument choice perspective to identify when states prefer custom over treaties and soft
law.
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vis-a`-vis one another. We encourage other scholars to explore the micro-
foundations of instrument choice, in particular when and why different
domestic actors express a preference for custom over international con-
ventions and nonbinding norms, and how those preferences are translated
into official state policy.
Second, we make a simplifying assumption that nations intentionally
select one international instrument over another. This assumption—that
states “choose” custom, rather than having custom imposed upon them or
having it develop as an essentially unconscious process—is borne out by
the examples discussed in Part IV. We also recognize, however, that pow-
erful nations have a greater ability than weaker states to control the con-
tent of CIL, and we take account of this fact in our analysis.
A third preliminary observation concerns our description of custom’s
“design features.” We use this term to refer to the attributes or character-
istics of CIL itself, not to specific tools or mechanisms, such as treaty exit
and escape clauses that states can select, discard, or modify when negotiat-
ing written international instruments.13 A state that chooses custom over
treaties or soft law is expressing a preference for an instrument with char-
acteristics that cannot be changed or are very difficult to modify. This
comparative lack of flexibility helps us to explain why CIL is limited to
particular types of cooperation problems—what we label as “custom’s do-
mains”—and to identify when custom’s design features and substantive
norms have advantages for one or more states over those of treaties and
soft law.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. We begin in Part II
by considering custom’s design features, which we distinguish from the ca-
nonical elements of custom (state practice and opinio juris) and the indi-
vidual doctrines associated with CIL. Specifically, we contend that, as an
ideal-type, custom is non-negotiated, unwritten, and universal, three char-
acteristics that distinguish CIL from both treaties and soft law, which are
almost always negotiated, written, and rarely universal either in formation
or application.14 These design features help to explain some of custom’s
peculiar doctrinal characteristics, and they cut across the doctrinal divide
which is said to distinguish “traditional” and “modern” custom.15
13. Rational design scholars generally refer to design features in the latter sense. But
they also recognize that some tools and mechanisms relating to the selection of institutional
forms or legal instruments are “not open to design choice because of technical considerations
or shared perceptions.” Koremenos, Lipson & Snidal, Rational Design of International Insti-
tutions, supra note 7, at 770.
14. Legal “bindingness” also distinguishes custom from soft law. To be sure, a state’s
preference for binding or “hard” norms also informs instrument choice, as do factors such as
the variable cost of reaching an agreement using different instruments. These aspects of in-
strument choice have been analyzed by other scholars. See, e.g., Abbott & Snidal, supra note
8, at 426–30. We put these characteristics aside to focus instead on those attributes that distin-
guish CIL from both treaties and soft law.
15. The traditional approach identifies custom inductively, primarily from state prac-
tice. Modern custom, in contrast, is derived deductively and relies heavily on assertions of
opinio juris. Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary
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Part III considers the constraints that limit states’ recourse to CIL to
particular types of cooperation problems or “domains.” Although cus-
tom’s design features make it ill-suited to resolve many transborder public
goods or collective action problems,16 we argue that states can nonetheless
generate custom in a range of potentially important contexts. Drawing
upon numerous historical and contemporary examples, we show that the
design features discussed in Part II facilitate custom’s formation primarily
in three situations: when all states benefit from a customary rule with low
distributional costs, when powerful nations impose a custom on weaker
states, and when states seek to entrench shared normative values. Outside
of these three domains—or where there is overlap among them—custom
is much less likely to form.
Part IV considers custom’s future in an international legal landscape
dominated by multilateral treaties and soft law initiatives. We argue that
states select CIL as their instrument of choice (within the constraints im-
posed by custom’s domains) when its substantive norms or its design fea-
tures confer advantages over those of soft law or treaties. For example,
states may use custom to “unbundle” certain negotiated aspects of multi-
lateral conventions, especially those that preclude reservations. A state
could decline to become a party to such a treaty yet profess that some or
most of its provisions (in particular those it favors) are binding as CIL.
Drawing from the law of the sea, international economic law, human
rights, the laws of war, and other substantive issue areas, Part IV provides
numerous contemporary examples in which states prefer custom to trea-
ties or soft law, based on either its substantive norms or design features.
Accordingly, custom remains relevant even in the age of soft law and trea-
ties, so long as states act within the constraints imposed by custom’s do-
mains. Part V concludes.
II. THE DESIGN FEATURES OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
This Part identifies three design features—custom’s universality, its
unwritten nature, and its non-negotiated character—that are essential
structural characteristics of CIL, which differentiate it from treaties and
soft law as a form of international cooperation. We distill these character-
istics from the extensive legal literature on custom as a source of interna-
tional law, in both its traditional and modern guises.
We acknowledge at the outset that these three design features (univer-
sal, unwritten, and non-negotiated) are ideal types, and that treaties and
soft law share these features to a limited degree. However, if one views
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 758–59 (2001) [hereinafter Rob-
erts, Traditional and Modern Approaches]; but see Stefan Talmon, Determining Customary
International Law: The ICJ’s Methodology Between Induction, Deduction and Assertion, 26
EUR. J. INT’L L. 417, 430–34 (2015) (disagreeing with the distinction).
16. See generally Daniel Bodansky, What’s in a Concept? Global Public Goods, Inter-
national Law, and Legitimacy, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 651 (2012); SCOTT BARRETT, WHY COOP-
ERATE?: THE INCENTIVE TO SUPPLY GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS (2007); TODD SANDLER,
GLOBAL COLLECTIVE ACTION (2004).
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each attribute along a spectrum, there can be little doubt that custom oc-
cupies the high end of the spectrum for each variable as compared to trea-
ties and soft law. Moreover, custom’s design features are fixed. Although
states are largely free to select the design features of treaties and soft law
that best suit their purposes, they generally lack the power to do so with
respect to custom.17 In the discussion that follows, we first address each
characteristic separately and then consider potential objections to this
typology.
A. Universal
Customary law aspires to universality in both its formation and appli-
cation. Article 38 of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) provides the
canonical definition of custom, as “a general practice accepted as law.”18
As the word “general” suggests, the practice of all nations is potentially
relevant to the formation of custom. States may choose to negotiate trea-
ties and soft law instruments with only a select group of states. By con-
trast, participation in the formation of custom is in principle open to all
nations,19 even if powerful or specially affected countries often have more
control over its development than do weaker or less interested states.20
Even for regional custom (discussed below), all states within the region
may participate in the practice that gives rise to a legal obligation.
This formulation of the state practice requirement reflects a normative
commitment to facilitating the creation of legal rules in which all nations
participate and that, in turn, apply to all nations.21 Consider how this com-
pares with other sources. Treaties achieve universality, if at all, only after
decades of arduous country by country ratification.22 Indicia of wide-
17. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
18. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060; see also Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian
Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Con-
flict, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 175, 179 (2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
19. See MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A
MANUAL ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERRELATION OF SOURCES 62 (2d ed.
1997) (“All States participate as equals in the formative process of customary law . . . .”);
MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES 75 (1999) (“[A]ll States, from
the weakest to the most powerful, have an equal entitlement to participate in the process of
customary international law.”).
20. See infra notes 30 and 102.
21. E.g., C. G. WEERAMANTRY, UNIVERSALISING INTERNATIONAL LAW 226 (2004);
ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1971); see
also Anthea Roberts, Righting Wrongs or Wronging Rights? The United States and Human
Rights Post-September 11, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 721, 737–38 (2004).
22. The Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions are rare examples of universal ratifica-
tion, a feat that required more than half a century to accomplish. Geneva Convention Rela-
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 287. No human rights treaty has achieved this result, even those that enshrine jus
cogens norms such as genocide and torture.
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spread state support for soft law are found in more diverse sources, such as
votes for resolutions in international organizations, endorsements by gov-
ernment officials, campaigns by civil society groups, and nonbinding
agreements. Yet there is no accepted method of evaluating these practices
to determine the extensiveness of international support for nonbinding
norms.
For custom, in contrast, it is widely agreed that a universal rule arises
even when many or even most states do nothing. These nations are said to
“tacitly accept” or “acquiesce” in an emerging rule; their consent may be
“inferred” from silence,23 if their consent is in fact required.24 These as-
sumptions, which make the development of universal custom markedly
easier, hold true for both traditional and modern forms of custom. “Tradi-
tionally, customary law has been made by a few interested states for all.”25
The process unfolds inductively, building up from specific examples of af-
firmative practice. “The awareness and opinions of other states that take
no overt position are rarely considered.”26 Modern custom flips this analy-
sis, applying a deductive process that begins with assertions of opinio juris
rather than discrete instances of practice.27 The result in either case is the
same: a universally applicable binding rule of international law.28
Three legal doctrines buttress custom’s universal aspirations: the posi-
tion of new states, the status of persistent objectors, and assertions of re-
gional custom. Each of these doctrines, properly understood, reinforces
custom’s universalist tendencies.
First, it is “widely accepted that a new State is bound by all rules of
general customary international law which existed at the time that State
came into being,” although such a state had no opportunity to support,
acquiesce in, or oppose these preexisting customs.29 The rationales offered
to justify this rule range from a benign desire to preserve stability in inter-
national relations to a nefarious effort to shackle “uncivilized” peoples
emerging from colonialism to legal rules previously developed by and ben-
efiting Western powers.30 Whatever the explanation, there has been little
23. DAVID BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 140, 166 (2010); As Bederman
succinctly explains, “for global custom, silence means acceptance of a new rule.” Id. at 154;
I.C. MacGibbon, The Scope of Acquiescence in International Law, 31 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 143,
151 (1954).
24. Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 531
(1993).
25. Id. at 538.
26. Id. at 537.
27. Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches, supra note 15, at 758.
28. States do sometimes use multilateral treaties to displace or change customary in-
ternational law. We discuss the “competitive” relationship between custom and treaties in
Part III. See also VILLIGER, supra note 19, at 151–66; Meyer, Codifying Custom, supra note 5,
at 1001 (“States seek to codify customary rules that benefit their interests as a way to define
and capture those rules.”).
29. BYERS, supra note 19, at 145.
30. Cf. Kelly, supra note 3, at 510 (asserting that “universal norms were imposed on
non-Western societies under the guise of a minimum standard of civilization while imperial
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if any pushback against this doctrine from the dozens of new nations that
have emerged since the end of the Second World War.31 When paired with
the well-settled (although recently challenged) prohibition on unilateral
withdrawal from extant custom,32 the result is a marked geographic expan-
sion of customary law’s reach.
The second legal doctrine, the persistent objector, arose to alleviate
the anxieties of positivist scholars, who were troubled by the notion that
states could be bound through acquiescence rather than express consent.33
According to the doctrine’s canonical definition, a nation that regularly
and vociferously opposes an emerging custom will, if the new rule eventu-
ally forms, not be bound by the rule in its relations with other states.34
Consistent with the rules applicable to the formation of custom, the option
to object is open to all nations.
If states regularly staked out positions as persistent objectors, our
claim that universal application is one of custom’s distinctive features
would be questionable. In fact, although most courts and commentators
now accept the persistent objector concept in principle,35 its application in
practice is both exceedingly rare and difficult to sustain in those few in-
stances when such an objection is raised.36
Why might this be the case? One answer is found in the principle of
reciprocity, which disadvantages putative objectors by forcing them to
bear the new custom’s burdens without enjoying its benefits. As Michael
Byers has illustrated with an example from the law of the sea, “[e]ven the
most powerful of the maritime States—the United States, the United
Kingdom and Japan—eventually abandoned their persistent objection to
the development of the twelve-mile territorial sea as a rule of customary
international law.”37 They did so “at least partly as a result of coastal fish-
ing and security concerns. Although foreign fishing vessels and spy ships
were able to operate just outside the three-mile limits of the persistently
objecting States, the objecting States’ vessels were excluded from waters
expansion into Africa and Asia continued”); D’AMATO, supra note 21, at 270 (stating that
custom is “applicable generally” and its importance is “rooted in the desire of the interna-
tional community for order and security”).
31. See UNITED NATIONS, GROWTH IN UNITED NATIONS MEMBERSHIP, 1945-PRESENT
(last visited Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml.
32. Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120
YALE L.J. 202, 204 (2010) (“[A] nation may have some ability to opt out of a CIL rule by
persistent objection to the rule before the time of its formation . . . but once the rule becomes
established, nations . . . never have the right to withdraw unilaterally from it.”).
33. For a succinct intellectual history of the doctrine, see id. at 233–39.
34. BYERS, supra note 19, at 180.
35. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY
(GENERAL) INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (2000) [hereinafter “ILA REPORT”] (“Although some
authors question the existence of this rule, most accept it as part of current international
law.”).
36. E.g., BEDERMAN, supra note 23, at 155; BYERS, supra note 19, at 181.
37. BYERS, supra note 19, at 181.
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within twelve miles of other States’ coastlines.”38 Reciprocity, in other
words, systematically discourages persistent objection to emerging cus-
toms that involve reciprocal rights and obligations. Thus, in practice, the
doctrine of persistent objectors poses little if any impediment to custom’s
applicability to all nations.39
A third doctrine reinforcing custom’s universality is the presumption
against regional custom. Commentators have long asserted that a custom
can, in principle, be restricted to a geographically linked group of coun-
tries. Such a rule would bind only the states in that area, leaving nations
elsewhere unaffected. If regional custom were a common source of inter-
national legal obligation, it would cast doubt on our universality claim.
Examples are few and far between, not the least because the ICJ has ac-
tively discouraged the formation of regional custom.
In the Asylum Case,40 the World Court considered Colombia’s allega-
tion that a Latin American custom required Peru to grant safe passage to
an individual to whom Colombia had granted political asylum. The ICJ
rejected this claim, reasoning that a state’s silence in response to an
emerging regional custom was to be construed as an objection. This is pre-
cisely the opposite of the rule governing global custom, where silence is
equated with acquiescence. Why, David Bederman pointedly asks, “did
the World Court change the calculus of consent for regional custom in The
Asylum Case?” His answer:
One can only conclude that the Court wished to suppress regional
custom, and there is no more effective way to do so than to de-
clare a presumption that fundamentally disrupts the formation of
such regional practices. [The ICJ] was concerned that develop-
ment of distinctive bodies of regional rules—not just for Latin
America, but perhaps also for Europe, Africa, and Asia—might
unduly interfere with the universal aspirations of international
law.41
The use of procedural rules that discouraged regional custom thus “pre-
served the ICJ’s prerogative to declare the content of customary interna-
tional law . . . for the benefit of . . . the global community at large.”42
38. Id.
39. Reciprocity does not explain the paucity of persistent objections to emerging cus-
tomary human rights norms, for which an objecting state may have little if any interest in
whether other nations follow the norm or not. Objection to such norms may be difficult to
sustain for another reason—sustained pressure from international human rights bodies and
campaigns by civil society groups. Such efforts eventually led to the abolition of the juvenile
death penalty in the United States notwithstanding that country’s persistent objection to that
norm. See, e.g., Scott Cummings, The Internationalization of Public Interest Law, 57 DUKE
L.J. 891, 993–95 (2008); Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and International Law,
52 DUKE L.J. 485, 536 (2002).
40. Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276–77 (Nov. 20).
41. BEDERMAN, supra note 23, at 152.
42. Id. at 153.
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B. Unwritten
A second feature that distinguishes custom from treaties and nonbind-
ing norms is that custom is an unwritten form of law. In a review of inter-
national law sources in the early years of the 20th century, Lassa
Oppenheim asserted that “[t]he rules of the present international law are
to a great extent not written rules, but based on custom.”43 Numerous
recent studies concur that custom is unwritten law, some even labeling this
as one of custom’s “defining characteristics.”44
In contrast, the vast majority of treaties are memorialized. Drafts are
circulated and marked up during negotiations, ultimately leading to the
adoption of a final authoritative text that is opened for signature. Several
rules and institutional features of the international legal system provide
strong incentives for states to put their agreements in writing. The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)—and the benefits of its many
default rules—apply only to written treaties, a limitation intended to pro-
mote predictability and legal certainty and reduce future interpretive dis-
putes.45 In addition, treaties cannot be entrusted to a depository or
included in published compendia such as the United Nations Treaty Series
unless they are in written form.46 Finally, some national laws require trea-
ties to be memorialized for various purposes.47
Nonbinding norms too are overwhelmingly written. Dinah Shelton’s
authoritative treatise identifies two types of soft law—primary and secon-
dary—both of which are embodied in written instruments. Shelton defines
primary soft law as “those normative texts not adopted in treaty form that
are addressed to the international community as a whole or to the entire
membership of the adopting institution or organization.”48 Examples in-
43. Lassa Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method, 2 AM. J.
INT’L L. 313, 315 (1908).
44. Roy M. Mersky & Jonathan Pratter, A Comment on the Ways and Means of Re-
searching Customary International Law: A Half-Century After the International Law Commis-
sion’s Work, 24 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 302, 303 (1996); see also EDUARDO JIME´NEZ DE
ARE´CHAGA, General Course in Public International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
PAST THIRD OF A CENTURY 12 (1979) (defining customary international law as “unwritten
law”); ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 196–203 (1958)
(describing the growth of “written law” at the expense of custom); HUGH THIRLWAY, INTER-
NATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION (1972) (“[T]he essence of customary law is
that it is lex non-scripta . . . .”); VILLIGER, supra note 19, at 15, 102–03 (defining customary
law as “unwritten” or “jus non-scriptum”); ILA REPORT, supra note 35, at 63 (“[T]he essence
of customary law is that it is the unwritten manifestation of the will of the international
community as a whole . . . .”).
45. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
46. Treaty Section of the Office of Legal Affairs, Treaty Handbook, at 3, 71–72, U.N.
Sales No. E.12.V.1 (2012).
47. See, e.g., Case Act, 1 U.S.C. § 112b (2012).
48. Dinah Shelton, Commentary and Conclusions, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE:
THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 449, 449–50
(Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) [hereinafter COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE]; see id. at 450–51
(citing examples).
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clude the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,
the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Jus-
tice, the Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and declarations
adopted at the close of U.N.-sponsored human rights conferences.49 Sec-
ondary soft law includes “the recommendations and general comments of
international human rights supervisory organs, the jurisprudence of courts
and commissions, decisions of special rapporteurs and other ad hoc bodies,
and the resolutions of political organs of international organizations apply-
ing primary norms.”50 These illustrations reveal that primary and secon-
dary soft law come in many shapes and sizes, but one feature that unites
all of these examples is their written form.
To be sure, written documents often provide evidence—sometimes the
best evidence—of state practice and opinio juris. Yet, references to written
materials to prove these elements does not transform custom into written
law. Rather, they further underscore the differences between custom on
the one hand, and treaties and soft law on the other.
First, custom is a “norm without a [formal] act, at least, without a
founding act, where you might hope to find its origin and from which you
might be able to derive its authority.”51 Proving the existence of custom
cannot, unlike most treaties and nonbinding norms, be done by consulting
a single authoritative text. Rather, a putative rule must be pieced together
from numerous sources—official publications, historical records, newspa-
per articles, and so forth—in dozens of nations.52 Diligent researchers may
identify these materials relatively easily for the few industrialized nations
that publish digests of state practice, but the task is far more difficult else-
where. And even for governments with large and sophisticated interna-
tional law departments, “customary practices are often not formally
recorded at all.”53
In addition, some treaties codify existing customary rules or crystalize
the formation of new custom, with the result that the same norm exists in
both sources of international law. This overlap between treaties and cus-
tom does not, however, render the latter as written law. To the contrary,
49. Id. at 450–52.
50. Id. at 452.
51. Mersky & Pratter, supra note 44, at 303–04 (quoting and translating Serge Sur,
Sources du Droit International—La Coutume, 13 JURISCLASSEUR DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL
4 (1989) (Fr.)); see also BEDERMAN, supra note 23, at 164 (“CIL norms do not . . . ever have
textual determinacy [unless and until they are] codified or embedded in authoritative deci-
sions.”); Maurice H. Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, 272
RECUEIL DES COURS 155, 172 (1998) (“[T]he characteristic of [custom] is that it is not just
unwritten, it is informal.”).
52. See, e.g., MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (5th ed. 2003) (“[T]he obvi-
ous way to find out how countries are behaving is to read the newspapers, consult historical
records, listen to what government authorities are saying, and peruse the many official
publications.”).
53. BEDERMAN, supra note 23, at 145.
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treaty and custom remain separate sources of obligation.54 As we later
explain, the enduring separation of these sources is particularly important
for non-ratifying countries and for state parties that later withdraw from a
treaty that embodies a customary rule.
C. Non-negotiated
A third distinctive characteristic of custom is that it is not negotiated
in the manner of treaties and soft law. Commentators describe the practice
that produces custom as “informal, haphazard, not deliberate, even partly
unintentional and fortuitous” as well as “unstructured and slow.”55 Even
scholars who perceive some order in this chaos characterize custom as
emerging from a “struggle for law reflected in exchanges of signals, cues,
bids, and responses”56 among states “competing in a marketplace of
rules.”57 Custom, in other words, is formed by iterated claims and de-
fenses in which some “groups of states may ‘bid’ new norms, while others
may object, and yet other countries may simply remain silent and so
acquiesce.”58
This process does not involve negotiation, which is commonly defined
as a “formal discussion between people who are trying to reach an agree-
ment.”59 Custom is not produced by a formal discussion or exchange of
views. In fact, the state practice that serves as its basis may not even be
motivated by a desire to reach an agreement.60
Many negotiations over legal instruments involve another element as
well, bargaining. Negotiation over treaties, for example, often involves
competing demands and concessions in which the parties trade various as-
pects of the form and substance of the agreement. Consider multilateral
54. KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 71 (2d ed. 1993);
R.Y. Jennings, The Progressive Development of International Law and Its Codification, 24
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 301, 303–04 (1947); see also North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Den./
Neth. v. Ger.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 71 (Feb. 20) (inferring the existence of a general custom from a
treaty “is not lightly to be regarded as having been attained”).
55. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 34
(2d ed. 1979); see also Meyer, Codifying Custom, supra note 5, at 1023; DANIEL BODANSKY,
THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 192, 203 (2010) [hereinaf-
ter BODANSKY, ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW]; GOLDSMITH &
POSNER, supra note 12, at 37.
56. BEDERMAN, supra note 23, at 165 (citing Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the
International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 705, 725 (1988)).
57. Id. at 150.
58. Id. at 143.
59. Negotiation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ne-
gotiation (last visited Aug. 15, 2016); cf. Negotiation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014) (defining “negotiation” as “a consensual bargaining process in which the parties at-
tempt to reach agreement on a disputed or potentially disputed matter”).
60. E.g., Bradley & Gulati, supra note 32, at 204 (“[T]he rules of CIL do not arise from
express negotiation.”).
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conventions that regulate global public goods or club goods.61 Most of
these agreements contain carefully crafted compromises, often hashed out
in exquisite detail among cross-cutting alliances.62 A group of states may
give up a preferred position in one section of a treaty (or in one treaty in a
nested treaty regime, such as the WTO) in exchange for benefits in an-
other section. Or a party may agree to less favorable substantive rules only
if those rules are phrased very broadly or if the treaty includes express exit
or escape clauses.63 These exchanges expand the zone of agreement, facili-
tating the resolution of “[m]ultilateral coordination problems [that] cannot
easily be solved in the informal, unstructured, and decentralized manner
typically associated with customary international law.”64
Custom also generally arises on a rule by rule basis. State practice and
opinio juris focus on a single, discrete legal issue, often expressed at a high
level of generality, rather than a fully fleshed-out group of norms with
carefully delineated contours and exceptions. This partly reflects the
largely unwritten nature of custom, which increases the cost and reduces
the efficacy of establishing multiple, related customs at the same time. But
it also makes custom a useful tool for general international rules that es-
chew country-specific or case-specific tailoring. As Bradley and Gulati as-
sert with reference to the custom of diplomatic immunity, “[i]f nations can
assume that the same rules of diplomatic immunity apply, no matter
where, then there will be no need to negotiate specific rules every time a
diplomatic mission is established in a new country.”65
One potential objection to our claim that custom is non-negotiated
arises from the widely-held view that U.N. General Assembly resolutions
are evidence of customary international law. These resolutions are some-
times the subject of intensive negotiations among dozens of countries, in-
cluding on-the-record debates, bargaining among state representatives,
and attempts to reach agreement on a written text. In 2013, for example,
the General Assembly adopted a resolution on data privacy66 that was the
product of extensive negotiations. States that engage in widespread data
collection were especially active in these negotiations and succeeded in
weakening the resolution’s final language.67
61. See RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUB-
LIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 347 (2d ed. 1996) (defining a “club good” as a good character-
ized by “the sharing of an excludable (rivalrous) public good”).
62. E.g., BYERS, supra note 19, at 169–70 (describing treaties as “set[ting] out a series
of closely related rights and obligations in written form”).
63. Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Custom: Analogies to Treaty Withdrawals, 21 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 65, 71 (2010) (describing treaties as “package deals that embody hard-
fought compromises among government negotiators”).
64. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 12, at 37.
65. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 32, at 247.
66. G.A. Res. 68/167, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/167 (Dec. 18, 2013).
67. See Dominic Rushe, UN Advances Surveillance Resolution Reaffirming “Human
Right to Privacy,” THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
nov/26/un-surveillance-resolution-human-right-privacy.
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If such resolutions were in themselves binding as CIL, our claim about
that source’s distinctive features would be difficult to sustain. Although a
few scholars have asserted that some General Assembly resolutions create
“instant custom,”68 such a claim is now discredited. Rather, it is widely
agreed that General Assembly resolutions provide only evidence of CIL,
with the weight of that evidence dependent upon factors such as voting
patterns, express reference to custom in the text, and, most importantly,
whether legal norms referred to in the resolution are subsequently rein-
forced by other indicia of state practice and opinio juris.69 In addition,
structural limitations constrain opportunities for negotiation of General
Assembly resolutions. The Assembly and its Main Committee include all
U.N. members. Negotiation on this scale is unwieldy, reducing the ability
of individual states to influence the drafting of language that describes the
resolution’s relationship to extant or emerging custom.70
A second potential objection to custom as non-negotiated relates to
the use of treaties as evidence of custom.71 Some treaties are intended to
codify preexisting custom, thereby rendering it less vague by memorial-
izing it.72 Such treaties may then serve as evidence of the content of the
customary norm, meaning that the negotiation of the treaty is potentially
also a negotiation about the content of custom.73 Yet states have an incen-
tive to continue to promote the customary norm even after the conclusion
of the treaty because the norm binds all states, even those not party to the
treaty.74
68. See, e.g., Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: “Instant” Interna-
tional Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 23 (1965). See generally F. Blaine Sloan, The
Binding Force of a ‘Recommendation’ of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 25
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 18–21 (1948) (discussing whether U.N. General Assembly Resolutions
are binding as customary international law); F. Blaine Sloan, General Assembly Resolutions
Revisited (Forty Years Later), 58 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 39, 68–77 (1987) (discussing how U.N.
General Assembly Resolutions contribute to the formation and development of customary
international law).
69. E.g., D’AMATO, supra note 21, at 78–79; Bruno Simma, International Human
Rights and General International Law: A Comparative Analysis, in IV-2 COLLECTED
COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW 153, 217 (1993); WOLFKE, supra note 54, at
83–85; Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the “Grotian Moment:” Accelerated Formation of Custom-
ary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 439, 447
(2010).
70. See Stephen M. Schwebel, The Effect of Resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly
on Customary International Law, 73 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 301, 302 (1979) (noting that
U.N. General Assembly votes are often cast “casually” and without the intention that the
“resolution is law”).
71. See generally VILLIGER, supra note 19 (exploring in detail the relationship between
custom and treaties).
72. See Meyer, Codifying Custom, supra note 5, at 1000.
73. Cf. id. at 1022 (arguing that “states use treaties, and the explicit bargaining
processes through which treaties are made, to shape customary rules in a way that works to
their individual benefit”).
74. See infra text at notes 175–76 (describing the relationship between treaties and
custom).
578 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 37:563
Other treaties aim to facilitate the development of new customary
norms. Still other agreements both restate existing custom and include
provisions that may crystalize into custom, in part through their inclusion
in the treaty. The VCLT is a well-known example. To the extent that trea-
ties such as the VCLT are adopted with the purpose of facilitating the
formation of new custom, the negotiation of the treaty is potentially also
an indirect negotiation of the customary norm.
Seen from this perspective, the distinction between custom and trea-
ties may seem quite thin, particularly with regard to the comparatively
non-negotiated character of custom. Jose´ Alvarez succinctly captures this
view, arguing that many multilateral codification conferences are “interna-
tional law-making fora for the purposes of not one but two potential
sources of international obligation”—treaty-making and “the elaboration
of codified custom.”75 Aware of this double function, states participating
in such conferences employ “conscious stratagems for reaffirming, modify-
ing, or elaborating codified custom.”76 This new form of creating custom,
Alvarez contends, “responds to states’ contemporary needs for a more
rapid, less vague, and deliberative process for the establishment of prefer-
ably written and clear global rules.”77
Nevertheless, like General Assembly resolutions, treaty norms do not
automatically become custom. As Robert Jennings has observed, “the very
fact of changing the law from an unwritten source to a written source is in
itself inevitably a major change.”78 Accordingly, the argument that treaty
provisions reflect preexisting or subsequently formed custom is often con-
tested or based on evidence found in multiple legal instruments. The pur-
ported duty to prevent transboundary pollution, for example, is based in
part on certain treaty clauses, but also rests on soft law documents such as
recommendations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment, the Stockholm and Rio Declarations, and U.N. General As-
sembly Resolutions, among other sources. As a result, whether customary
international law in fact imposes such a duty remains contested.79
To the extent that treaties do articulate customary norms it is often
because they reflect preexisting norms of customary law, like pacta sunt
servada. The subsequent treaty does not render the preexisting custom ne-
gotiated. To the contrary, the act of codification often changes the content
of rule for the treaty but not for its customary law antecedent. Codifica-
tion treaties generally “lay down the customary rule in a more precise and
systematic manner,” and the “[j]us scriptum may cure omissions, eliminate
75. JOSE´ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 390 (2005)
[hereinafter ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS].
76. Id.
77. Id. at 387.
78. See VILLIGER, supra note 19, at 103 (quoting R.Y. Jennings, What is International
Law and How Do We Tell It When We See It? in 37 SCHWEIZERISCHES JAHRBUCH Fu¨R IN-
TERNATIONALS RECHT 57, 62 (1981)).
79. Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and not so Customary) International Environmental
Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105, 110–11 (1995).
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anachronisms, introduce recent doctrinal findings, or even consider the
eventual enforcement (or adjudication) of the written rule. As a result,
codification contains a creative element and regularly entails a certain
amount of change.”80
Moreover, the kinds of treaties that are generally cited as evidence of
custom tend to have a somewhat less negotiated character. Many are
drafted or negotiated under the auspices of an international organization
such as the United Nations General Assembly (through a referral to the
International Law Commission). The involvement of international organi-
zations tends to expand the number of states involved,81 increase the pres-
ence of NGOs, involve high levels of openness, and increase the
importance of independent experts—all of which reduces the ability of
particular states to control the outcome.82 Nevertheless, some of the trea-
ties that emerge from this process are highly negotiated, including the
U.N. Convention on the Law of Sea and the Rome Statute establishing the
International Criminal Court. Consistent with their negotiated character,
neither permits reservations, and both have proven to be especially con-
troversial evidence of customary international law.83
We anticipate a number of objections to our claim that CIL has three
essential structural characteristics, which we label as custom’s design fea-
tures. Positivist international law scholars may protest that we give insuffi-
cient attention to state practice, opinio juris, and canonical legal doctrines
associated with CIL. We agree that these topics are central to understand-
ing when states choose custom over treaties and soft law. However, we see
these doctrines—both in their traditional form and as re-envisioned by
modern approaches to custom—as products of the three overarching at-
tributes we identify. Indeed, analyzing custom from the perspective of its
design features illuminates potential explanations for longstanding areas
of doctrinal confusion, as well as topics, such as the persistent objector and
the presumption against regional custom that garner significant attention
in legal treatises but are rarely followed in practice.
Other commentators may challenge our claim that the three design
features accurately characterize CIL or distinguish it from treaties and soft
law. Some customary rules are, after all, memorialized in written docu-
80. VILLIGER, supra note 19, at 104 (citations omitted).
81. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 75, at 276 (“Invitations to
join in multilateral treaty-making efforts [by international organizations] are today regarded
as matters of sovereign right, unless the treaty is intended to be of merely regional interest.”).
82. See id. at 277.
83. See, e.g., David Sheffer & Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The
Resiliency of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute and the Case for a Counterat-
tack Strategy in Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 334, 348–53 (2011) (“The
Rome Statute is a negotiated treaty of considerable complexity designed to govern only the
ICC. The Rome Statute in its entirety was never intended to reflect customary international
law. Relatively few of the provisions of the Rome Statute merit that rigorous categoriza-
tion.”); see also infra text at notes 181–82 (discussing controversy about using some provi-
sions of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea as evidence of customary international
law).
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ments, and some nonbinding instruments are adopted by international or-
ganizations with little if any negotiation among member states. Our
overarching response to this critique is to reiterate that custom’s three dis-
tinctive attributes are not rigid, binary categories. We have been careful to
describe custom as universal, unwritten, and non-negotiated in relation to
treaties and soft law. If all three norms were located along a spectrum that
runs, for example, from fully non-negotiated at one end to entirely negoti-
ated at the other, custom would be much closer to one pole than the other
two legal norms. The same is true for the other two characteristics. Our
contention is that these differences, even if they are differences in degree
rather than in kind, are empirically accurate, legally consequential and (as
we now discuss) illuminate constraints on the creation of CIL that help to
explain why custom has emerged in some areas of interstate cooperation
but not others.
III. CUSTOM’S DOMAINS
The foregoing section described three distinctive design features of
CIL—it is universal, unwritten, and non-negotiated. Because these charac-
teristics are relatively fixed and cannot be manipulated to the same extent
as the design elements of treaties and soft law,84 the characteristics con-
strain when states can turn to custom to create international law. Given
these constraints, we argue that CIL forms primarily in three domains—
when all nations benefit from a general legal norm with low distributional
costs, when powerful countries make visible and sustained commitments
to a legal norm, and when states seek to entrench shared normative values.
The significance of each of the three distinctive design features varies con-
text to context, but all three features are important to understanding cus-
tom’s domains.
A. Custom that Benefits All States
States will use a non-negotiated, universal, and unwritten form of le-
galized cooperation to create rules from which all states benefit. Because
such rules advantage all nations in relatively equal measure regardless of
their size, economic might, or military power, they have few distributional
consequences and reinforce the foundational principle of sovereign
equality.85
The three distinctive features of custom identified in Part II facilitate
the generation of this category of international norms. Negotiation is un-
necessary because states benefit from the rules as such without the need to
make specific demands and concessions. Unwritten practice suffices to en-
gender consensus about general rules that lack tailored or detailed provi-
sions. Indeed, the unwritten character of custom helps to secure states’
84. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
85. Customary rules that benefit all states may, of course, disadvantage many non-
state entities including private individuals and firms, colonies, indigenous peoples, political
entities that aspire to statehood, or parties who trade with government entities.
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agreement to a legal norm articulated at a high level of generality by de-
ferring potential disputes over specific interpretations or applications.
Universality means that states can predict that other nations will be bound
to the rule, which may constrain self-interested behavior in the future
when some states face strong incentives to defect.
All-states-benefit custom often arises from areas of interstate behav-
ior that were previously unregulated by any international rules, and it is
comprised of legal norms that are articulated at a high level of generality.
Many venerable rules of international law have these qualities.86 For ex-
ample, all nations gain from having predetermined methods of communi-
cating with each other through representatives without the fear of arrest
or civil suits related to the officials’ duties. Customary law thus provides
for the immunity of diplomats and consular officials. Other examples in-
clude pacta sunt servana, territorial prescriptive jurisdiction, the prohibi-
tion of piracy, and the immunity of states from suit in foreign courts over
sovereign or public acts (jure imperii).87 Two additional illustrations from
the law of the sea and outer space help to illuminate the contours of this
category of custom.
Consider the mare liberum principle, first espoused by Hugo Grotius,
which has long protected freedom of navigation over the world’s oceans.
As Sir William Scott wrote in an early 19th century court case rejecting
British efforts to enforce a domestic ban on the slave trade against foreign
vessels, the universal appeal of mare liberum was an important justifica-
tion for its acceptance as custom:
all nations being equal, all have an equal right to the uninter-
rupted use of the unappropriated parts of the ocean for their navi-
gation. In places where no local authority exists, where the
subjects of all states meet upon a footing of entire equality and
independence, no one state, or any of its subjects, has a right to
assume or exercise authority over the subjects of another.88
A similar rationale undergirds the countervailing custom that the flag
state has sole jurisdiction over vessels that sail on the high seas under its
badge of nationality. As one commentator has explained, the benefits ac-
cruing to all nations from the mare liberum and flag state rules were “mu-
tually reinforcing,” aiding the formation of both customs:
86. Anthony D’Amato describes this aspect of custom when he notes that the custom-
ary rules “probably better reflect the national interests of all the states” than does interna-
tional legislation; and that many rules of international law “help reinforce the territorial
sovereignty of states,” and “the validity of the entire body of international rules is reinforced
by the consensus that the rules are in the subjects’ best interests.” D’AMATO, supra note 21,
at 29–31. Using game theory, all-states-benefit custom can be analogized to custom that
arises from “coordination games.” See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 12, at 32–35,
54–58.
87. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), 2012 I.C.J. 99, 143 (Feb. 3).
88. Le Louis (1817) 165 Eng. Rep. 1464, 1475.
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reciprocal respect for the exclusive jurisdiction of states over their
ships provided a sort of state-to-state equality of opportunity. All
states met upon equal footing on the high seas and could make
free use of the sea for maximum benefit, but no state could inde-
pendently impose its legislative will upon the modalities of use.89
Turning from the oceans to the heavens, the universal recognition that
“outer space is unsusceptible to national or private appropriation” aided
rapid acceptance of the non-appropriation principle—a prohibition of ter-
ritorial occupation or acquisition—as the customary ground norm for fu-
ture activities in space.90 The principle has benefitted all states, facilitating
“the orderly development of space activities for more than forty years
and . . . effectively prevent[ing] a colonial race in the high frontier.”91 To
be sure, disagreements have arisen at the margins, in particular over the
upper extent of the earth’s atmosphere. But consistent with our theory,
the contending positions over these boundary issues have been advanced,
and compromises achieved, via multilateral treaties and soft law, not by
challenges to the customary non-appropriation principle as such.92
In sum, the all-states-benefit principle explains the formation of many
foundational rules of customary international law. But it also sheds light
on why custom plays only a limited role in other areas of interstate coop-
eration. Many important problems faced by the international community
involve difficult and contentious questions of how to distribute the bene-
fits and burdens of cooperation among differently situated states. If gov-
ernments perceive that distributive effects of an international rule are
high, unwritten and non-negotiated custom will serve as a poor alternative
to treaties and soft law, where specific quid pro quo trade-offs can be
worked out, or finely-tuned language can be negotiated, to suit all parties
at the table. Climate change and other global environmental problems are
prime examples. In these contexts, to the extent that custom forms at all, it
will do so around highly abstract norms that leave distributive questions to
future negotiations. For example, customary rules of international envi-
ronmental law tend to be extremely broad and open-ended—what Dan
Bodansky describes as a “common ethical framework.”93 They also tend
to be derived from soft law and treaties, which allow states to shape rules
with distributional consequences in mind.94
89. Michael A. Becker, The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of Naviga-
tion and the Interdiction of Ships at Sea, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 131, 169 (2005).
90. Zachos A. Paliouras, The Non-Appropriation Principle: The Grundnorm of Inter-
national Space Law, 27 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 37, 54 (2014).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 51–53 (analyzing the 1976 Bogota Declaration in which eight equatorial
states asserted sovereignty over the geostationary earth orbit, but arguing that the Declara-
tion violates preexisting customary law and is contrary to the Outer Space Treaty).
93. BODANSKY, ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra
note 55, at 203.
94. Id.
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As explained above, the unwritten character of all-states-benefit cus-
tom means that the resulting legal rules are often amorphous and mallea-
ble. This facilitates widespread initial agreement to a rule, while also
giving states leeway to assert their preferred interpretation when applying
that rule to specific contexts or new circumstances. To be sure, no rule is
entirely free from distributional consequences. As general rules become
increasingly particularized in response to these claims, however, distribu-
tional issues often become more acute. Custom’s distinctive features make
it far less useful for resolving these distributional controversies. Instead,
states attempt to resolve these concerns through treaty negotiations and
codification exercises. Consistent with the argument advanced here, Tim
Meyer has shown that efforts to codify preexisting custom is “often driven
by distributional concerns.”95 This highlights an important corollary to our
theory—over time, all-states-benefit custom tends to become more con-
tentious as it is applied to new circumstances, increasing the likelihood
that states will turn to treaty-making or codification to resolve disagree-
ments over the norm. As we explain in Part IV, however, all-states-benefit
custom remains relevant even after norms have been codified.
The history of sovereign immunity illustrates this trajectory. Early do-
mestic suits against foreign states were often brought against state-owned
maritime vessels. The doctrine of absolute immunity thus benefited coun-
tries with large navies and merchant marines, which were immune from
suit.96 On the other hand, private firms and individuals in these countries
often had potential claims against foreign vessels, so these states bore the
burden as well as the benefit of an absolute immunity rule. As states be-
came more significant economic actors in first part of the 20th Century,
the economic importance of state immunity rules increased, which magni-
fied existing distributional effects and generated new ones. The benefits
accruing to governments that nationalized private industries and the
“State trading activities” of the Soviet Union and other socialist nations
were particular concerns.97 In part as a result, many states abandoned ab-
95. Meyer, Codifying Custom, supra note 5, at 1001.
96. Jurisdiction of Municipal Courts over Foreign States in Actions Arising out of Their
Commercial Activities, 40 YALE L.J. 786, 786 n.2 (1931) [hereinafter Jurisdiction of Municipal
Courts] (“The doctrine [of absolute immunity] has had its principal development in suits in
admiralty.”). Not surprisingly, the United States and the United Kingdom—both strong na-
val powers—were also slow to abandon absolute immunity. Id. at 786. After World War I, the
United States had the world’s largest merchant marine fleet. See Allan A. Arnold, Merchant
Marine, in THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 378, 380
(Anne Cipriano Venzon ed., 1999). In 1926, the Supreme Court held that state-owned vessels
engaged in commercial trading were entitled to immunity. Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro,
271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926). Recent scholarship has identified small capitalists as the early
adopters of the restrictive approach. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Erik Voeten, How Does
Customary International Law Change? The Case of State Immunity, 59 INT’L STUD. Q. 209,
214 (2015).
97. XIAODONG YANG, STATE IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 19–20 (2012); see
also THEODORE R. GIUTTARI, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: AN ANALY-
SIS OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 63–64 (1970) (describing the shift away from absolute immu-
nity as a result of nationalization of key industries during World War I, the post-war tendency
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solute immunity in favor of a restrictive rule, which does not protect the
commercial activities of foreign sovereigns. Consistent with our claim, al-
though the absolute immunity arose with little dissent, the shift to restric-
tive immunity remains contested after more than a century. As one
Chinese author recently explained, “developing countries, to better pro-
tect their own national interests, should continue to adhere to the principle
of absolute immunity and should not follow the footsteps of the developed
countries to accept the restrictive approach.”98
The heightened salience of distributional costs and the collapse of con-
sensus around absolute immunity also coincided with the growth of trea-
ties governing this topic.99 Unable to secure acceptance of restrictive
immunity as a customary rule, proponents of that approach turned to bi-
lateral or regional agreements.100 Efforts to codify restrictive immunity in
a global treaty have been less successful. A U.N. convention endorsing
that approach was adopted in 2004, but has yet to enter into force.101
B. Hegemonic Custom
The non-negotiated, universal, and unwritten characteristics of custom
also facilitate efforts by powerful states to create international rules that
bind all nations. We label these rules as hegemonic custom. That powerful
states play an important or even dispositive role in the formation of CIL is
not a new observation,102 but no other scholar has (to our knowledge)
of countries to direct or participate in their nation’s business and economic affairs, and the
“relative success of the Russian Revolution”); Jurisdiction of Municipal Courts, supra note
96, at 786 (“The increased participation of States in enterprises formerly confined to private
persons has led to a growing pressure for modification of the rules exempting foreign states
from the jurisdiction of municipal courts.”).
98. Dahai Qi, State Immunity, China and Its Shifting Position, 7 CHINESE J. INT’L L.
307, 324 (2008).
99. See YANG, supra note 97, at 444–46 (providing a general overview of various trea-
ties that touched on sovereign immunity); Derek Asiedu-Akrofi, Central Bank Immunity and
the Inadequacy of the Restrictive Immunity Approach, 28 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 263, 272–73
(1990) (stating that the absolute immunity theory declined “as a result of developments in
international trade.”); Verdier & Voeten, supra note 96, at 214–15 (presenting data showing
an increase in states adopting the restrictive theory of immunity, which includes states
“enter[ing] into bilateral or small multilateral treaties”).
100. GIUTTARI, supra note 97, at 316–17 (describing the Brussels Convention of 1926,
post-World War II bilateral friendship, commerce and navigation treaties, and the 1958
United Nations Convention on the High Seas); see also James Crawford, Execution of Judg-
ments and Foreign Sovereign Immunity, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 820, 820–21 (1981) (examining
bilateral and regional agreements regarding sovereign immunity since “no comprehensive
treaty on state immunity” exists).
101. Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, G.A.
Res. 59/38, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/38 (Dec. 2, 2004).
102. See, e.g., CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 153–63 (P.E. Corbett trans.) (rev. ed. 1968); WOLFKE, supra note 54, at 78;
BYERS, supra note 19, at 129–203; Charney, supra note 24, at 537; ILA REPORT, supra note
35, at 26; James Gathii, War’s Legacy in International Investment Law, 11 INT’L COMMUNITY
L. REV. 353, 363–66 (2009); see also GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 12, at 28–29, 52–53
(arguing that some forms of CIL are best understood in terms of coercion).
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linked the role of power to custom’s distinctive design features or used it
to develop a theory of instrument choice for custom. Below we discuss a
number of variations of hegemonic custom, identify the conditions that
make it more or less likely to be accepted by other nations, and analyze
when powerful states turn to treaties and soft law to bolster their efforts to
promote a desired customary rule. Before proceeding, we emphasize that
we do not take a position on the normative desirability of hegemonic norm
creation, focusing instead on its relationship to custom’s distinctive charac-
teristics. We take up normative issues in the paper’s conclusion.
It is hardly surprising that powerful nations advance international
rules that further their interests regardless of whether those rules benefit
other countries. Yet given custom’s universal scope and the ability of all
states to object to the formation of an emerging norm, one might assume
that attempts by hegemons to instantiate a preferred rule or practice as
binding law would be doomed to failure. In fact, less powerful nations
have sometimes embraced or at least acquiesced in campaigns for new cus-
tomary rules by one or more powerful nations.
Perhaps the best examples involve the law of the sea. President Tru-
man issued a proclamation in September 1945 claiming for the United
States jurisdiction and control over its continental shelf, including beyond
its territorial sea.103 Because that area of the seabed was then part of the
high seas and thus available for exploitation by all, the Truman Proclama-
tion had significant distributional consequences. Yet coastal states quickly
emulated the Proclamation and asserted sovereignty over their respective
continental shelves.104 Perhaps more surprisingly, landlocked nations also
rapidly accepted the norm. The speed with which the custom crystalized
was striking. As one commentator pithily noted, “the Truman proclama-
tion was revolutionary in 1945 but passe´ by 1958.”105
What explains the rapid and universal acceptance of this new legal
norm, advanced by the world’s most powerful maritime nation, without
formal negotiations or carefully delineated treaty texts? The timing—just
after the end of the Second World War—was propitious. Many nations
were still recovering from that conflict and others become economically or
politically dependent on the United States during the Cold War’s first dec-
ade. Both trends discouraged efforts to “challenge the [Truman] doctrine
or reveal its flaws.”106 In addition, the new rule’s distributional costs were
somewhat uncertain. Most countries lacked the resources or technological
knowhow to exploit the continental shelf (by drilling for oil, for example).
103. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Sept. 28, 1945).
104. MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF FUNDAMEN-
TAL CHANGE: RECOGNIZING GROTIAN MOMENTS 115–17 (2013) [hereinafter SCHARF, CUS-
TOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW].
105. James A. Green, 63 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 781, 782 (2014) (reviewing SCHARF, CUS-
TOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 104).
106. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 104, at 116 (quoting
SUZETTE V. SUAREZ, THE OUTER LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF: LEGAL ASPECTS OF
THEIR ESTABLISHMENT 28 (2008)) (citations omitted).
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But such distributional costs that could be identified were partly mitigated
by Truman’s promise to issue leases to foreign corporations. Arguably the
most important explanation for the doctrine’s acceptance, however, was
the claim by other coastal states—including two veto-wielding permanent
members of the recently-created U.N. Security Council—that asserting
sovereignty over their respective continental shelves was permitted by cus-
tomary international law.107
The credible, visible commitments to the new custom by these nations
yielded a better outcome for all states than the uncertainty of no agree-
ment, even if some governments would have preferred a different rule (in
other words, there are distributional consequences in selecting a particular
rule). Game theorists label this as a “battle of the sexes.”108 Ed Swaine has
applied this analysis to the formation of new custom. He argues that “it is
at these early stages where credible commitments, backed by reputational
investment in the customary international law regime, may usefully dimin-
ish uncertainty and allow coordination to be attained more rapidly and
with less friction.”109 Announcing a customary rule “permits a state to
commit to one of the equilibria and to have its representation regarded as
binding.”110 Although Swaine does not limit his analysis to a particular
type of nation, his example—the development of the three-mile territorial
sea—concerns a rule backed by two powerful maritime countries, England
and the United States.111
We extend Swaine’s insight by explaining how custom’s distinctive fea-
tures facilitate the formation of hegemonic custom in a battle of the sexes
situation. A hegemon’s credible public commitment to a new legal rule on
a take-it-or-leave-it basis may convince other governments that they are
unlikely to obtain a more favorable rule through a treaty or soft law.
Weaker states in particular may conclude that resistance is not worth the
effort (since, by definition, the proffered custom is better than none), or
they may see little reason to try to improve the rule through negotiations
in which the powerful state may have an even stronger hand. For the new
custom’s proponents, this method of international norm creation is often
faster and less onerous than either formal treaty-making processes or
breaching existing rules. Although the “continual, overt exercise of
power” is possible, it is also costly, providing hegemons with a strong in-
centive to legalize interstate relations in “settled rules.”112
107. Id. at 117 (noting declarations by Britain and Mexico).
108. This game is characterized by two equilibrium outcomes, one of which is preferred
by each of the players. Yet the players in a battle of the sexes also share a common interest in
avoiding a particular outcome: non-cooperation. Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collabo-
ration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 115, 120 (Stephen D.
Krasner ed., 1983).
109. Swaine, Rational Custom, supra note 11, at 599.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 601–02.
112. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 8, at 448.
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Another type of hegemonic custom concerns rules espoused during
periods when a relatively small number of powerful nations dominated
international society, a state of affairs that reached its apogee in the late
19th and early 20th century and continued, to a diminishing extent, until
the end of colonialism in the 1960s. Commentators have rightly empha-
sized how the international rules of this period systematically harmed or
ignored non-European nations and peoples. However, there were also bat-
tles over custom among the Western states. Britain’s efforts to outlaw the
transatlantic slave trade is the most prominent example.
Beginning in the early 1800s, Britain deployed a multi-prong strategy
to stamp out the slave trade. It asserted a unilateral right to interdict ves-
sels on the high seas, seized vessels carrying human chattel from Africa to
the Americas, and sought to establish a basis in treaties and customary
international law for proscribing the slave trade and enforcing that ban via
interdiction.113 The outcome of these efforts, by the end of the 19th cen-
tury, was a customary law prohibition on the slave trade that extended to
states that had not ratified treaties proscribing that practice and, by anal-
ogy to piracy, permitted any nation to seize slaving ships.114
Unlike the Truman Proclamation, however, Britain’s ultimately suc-
cessful campaign against the slave trade required sustained legal and dip-
lomatic efforts lasting over half a century. These efforts paired the
negotiation of bilateral and multilateral treaties with other European pow-
ers and the United States with soft law declarations and assertions of cus-
tomary international law. The early years of the campaign met with stiff
resistance. The first bilateral treaties Britain secured did not authorize in-
terdiction, and a key British court decision in 1817 held that searching
vessels on the high seas infringed the exclusive jurisdiction of flag
states.115 The result, as Michael Byers has explained, was that the British
government failed in its initial “attempt to assert a putative new right of
customary international law against a nonconsenting state.”116
113. See Becker, supra note 89, at 208–10; Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas: The
Proliferation Security Initiative, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 526, 534–36 (2004) [hereinafter Byers,
Policing the High Seas].
114. For different positions on the date when this CIL rule crystalized, see Byers, Polic-
ing the High Seas, supra note 113, at 534, 536; Jenny S. Martinez, International Courts and the
U.S. Constitution: Reexamining the History, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1069, 1123 (2010–2011); MY-
ERS S. MCDOUGAL & WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS–A CONTEM-
PORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 882 (1962).
115. Le Louis, (1817) 165 Eng. Rep. 1464, 1478–79. An 1825 decision of the U.S. Su-
preme Court was even more explicit. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825). Chief
Justice Marshall characterized the slave trade as “abhorrent,” but held that it “has been sanc-
tioned in modern times by the laws of all nations who possess distant colonies” and “has
claimed all the sanction which could be derived from long usage, and general acquiescence.”
Id. at 115. Thus, Marshall explained, “[t]hat trade could not be considered as contrary to the
law of nations.” Id.
116. Byers, Policing the High Seas, supra note 113, at 535; see also Martinez, supra note
114, at 1114 (“Between 1818 and 1824, it was the opinion of most, though not all, commenta-
tors and judges that, although the slave trade might be contrary to natural law, the general
and customary law of nations still allowed the slave trade.”).
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This failure did not, however, lead Britain to abandon its effort to se-
cure a universally applicable rule. Although the later treaties it negotiated
outlawed the trade and provided a limited right of interdiction, these
agreements did not bind nonparties.117 Nevertheless, British ships contin-
ued to interdict the vessels of nations that were lawfully transporting Afri-
can slaves across the Atlantic.118 By these actions, Britain sought “to
convert the[ ] practice of vigilante justice into a lawful act in accord with
the larger framework of the public order of the oceans” and “a universally
accepted legal norm.”119 The government did so by a clever recasting of
slave trade as an act of piracy, a longstanding crime under customary inter-
national law that all nations were authorized to prevent and punish.120
In sum, “[t]he history of the British attempt to ban the transatlantic
slave trade demonstrates how very difficult it is to achieve a customary
international law right of interdiction on the high seas.”121 That such a
custom arose notwithstanding the hurdles to its formation is due in large
part to the sedulous campaign waged by the world’s then most powerful
maritime nation. To be sure, other factors aided the formation of the cus-
tom, most notably that “enforcing the prescription . . . became less conten-
tious and more widely accepted when few states had a competing interest
in favor of preserving the practice.”122 Yet as scholars have shown, the
slave trade did not collapse under its own weight. To the contrary, govern-
ments and firms only abjured the lucrative practice in response to a mas-
sive transnational social movement and sustained political and legal
pressure by abolitionist nations, most notably Britain, that reframed what
had been viewed as an economic transaction in humanitarian terms.123
Most important for our purposes, custom’s distinctive features aided
Britain’s efforts to eradicate the slave trade. The government sought a uni-
versal ban, a result more easily achieved via a customary rule than by a
series of bilateral and plurilateral treaties with varying terms that, in any
event, did not bind nonparties. These gaps in treaty coverage were a genu-
ine concern. As Noora Araja¨rvi has recently written, “many (dominant)
countries, which were not party to the treaties, for instance Spain, contin-
ued to exercise the slave trade” during the middle decades of the 19th
century.124 This sheds additional light on the references to the slave trade
as piracy in the compacts that Britain negotiated. Although these provi-
117. Byers, Policing the High Seas, supra note 113, at 535.
118. Becker, supra note 89, at 209.
119. Id. at 208, 210.
120. Byers, Policing the High Seas, supra note 113, at 536.
121. Id.
122. Becker, supra note 89, at 210.
123. E.g., ADAM HOCHSCHILD, BURY THE CHAINS: PROPHETS AND REBELS IN THE
FIGHT TO FREE AN EMPIRE’S SLAVES (2006); JENNY S. MARTINEZ, THE SLAVE TRADE AND
THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2012).
124. NOORA ARAJA¨RVI, THE CHANGING NATURE OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW: METHODS OF INTERPRETING THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS 36 (2014).
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sions were “couched within an essentially contractual agreement,” they
had a broader aim: “extending the right of visitation to vessels from non-
consenting states” and thus facilitating the formation of a new custom.125
Britain’s interdiction of vessels on the high seas and its assertions of a legal
right to interdict—both unwritten practices—were crucial to maintaining
pressure on non-parties to renounce the slave trade. Finally, for nations
reluctant to sign a treaty, negotiations were of little use; unilateral actions
and assertions of legal rights were far more important.
The Truman Proclamation and the abolition of the slave trade are ex-
amples of successful hegemonic custom. Powerful nations do not, however,
always prevail in their efforts to promote a new international rule. To the
contrary, the rapid increase in the number of nations and in the diversity
of their interests following the Second World War has eroded—although
not entirely eliminated—the creation of hegemonic custom.
Demands by the United States and other capital-exporting nations for
full compensation for expropriated alien property provides a classic exam-
ple. The U.S. position was most famously asserted by U.S. Secretary of
State Cordell Hull in a letter to the government of Mexico in the late
1930s. In response to Mexico’s expropriation of property owned by U.S.
nationals, Hull, coining the doctrine that was to bear his name, asserted
that under customary international law “no government is entitled to ex-
propriate private property, for whatever purpose, without provision for
prompt, adequate, and effective payment therefor.”126 According to some
scholars,
Secretary of State Hull accurately presented the then current posi-
tion in international law in 1938 when he wrote his famous letter
to the Mexican Government . . . . Even though the Soviet Union
and Latin American countries had challenged the rule before that
time, it appears that the overwhelming practice and the prevailing
legal opinion supported Hull’s position.”127
If there was consensus regarding the standard of full compensation,
however, it was short lived. By the 1960s, the objections of Latin Ameri-
can states were joined by those of newly independent countries in Africa
125. Byers, Policing the High Seas, supra note 113, at 536. For further discussion of
Britain’s strategy of using treaties to facilitate the development of custom, see Martinez,
supra note 114, at 1118 & n.293.
126. The Secretary of State to the Mexican Ambassador (Castillo Na´jera) (Washington,
D.C., July 21, 1938), in 5 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, DIPLOMATIC PAPERS
1938, 687 (1956).
127. Rudolf Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property,
75 AM. J. INT’L L. 553, 558 (1981). For a contrary view about the Hull doctrine’s status as
custom at the time it was articulated, see Oscar Schachter, Editorial Comment, Compensa-
tion for Expropriation, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 121, 122–23 (1984).
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and Asia, which together turned to the U.N. General Assembly to assert a
legal rule that was far more favorable to expropriating nations.128
Yet the most extreme position advocated by capital-importing coun-
tries did not prevail. Latin American nations had long advocated a com-
peting legal rule—the Calvo doctrine—which held that “aliens are not
entitled to rights and privileges not accorded nationals, and that therefore
they may seek redress for grievances only before the local authorities,” not
via international arbitration or diplomatic protection.129 Since custom did
not limit a government’s power to seize the property of citizens, this na-
tional treatment standard gave expropriating states a legal justification for
not compensating foreigners either.130 Over time, however, expropriating
countries abandoned this extreme position and accepted “that compensa-
tion must be paid for expropriated alien property as a matter of interna-
tional law.”131 The amount of such compensation has remained contested,
however, which helps to explain why the United States and European na-
tions have successfully championed the Hull doctrine in a dense web of
bilateral investment treaties, which now themselves are cited as evidence
of CIL.132
C. Normative Custom
States also use custom to entrench other-regarding values or goals in
international law. We refer to this as “normative custom,” which we
broadly define to include an assertion of a customary rule that is plausibly
advanced as salutary for the international legal system as a whole, even if
the rule has distributional costs. The other-regarding character of norma-
tive custom distinguishes it most obviously from hegemonic custom—al-
though the two categories may overlap, as illustrated by the divergent
motivations for abolishing the slave trade, discussed above. We do not,
however, endorse any external standard for assessing whether a putatively
other-regarding custom is in fact generally desirable.133 Rather, such
claims will succeed or fail depending on whether other states and non-
state actors accept the asserted normative custom as genuinely other-re-
garding. Although open-ended, this capacious conception of normative
128. See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 646–48 (1998).
129. DONALD R. SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE 19 (1955).
130. See Bernardo M. Cremades, Disputes Arising out of Foreign Direct Investment in
Latin America: A New Look at the Calvo Doctrine and Other Jurisdictional Issues, 59 DISP.
RESOL. J. 78, 81 (2004); see also JAMES THUO GATHII, WAR, COMMERCE, AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 157 (2010) (citation omitted) (“[T]he Calvo clause was predicated on the view
that there did not exist a universal or international standard of justice that alien investors
were entitled to under customary international law.”).
131. Dolzer, supra note 127, at 561–62.
132. See Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, supra note 3, at 61–69.
133. For a recent effort to identify such an external standard, see STEVEN R. RATNER,
THE THIN JUSTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A MORAL RECKONING OF THE LAW OF NA-
TIONS 64–99 (2015) (identifying principles of justice to evaluate international legal rules as
the preservation of peace and the protection of human rights).
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custom intuitively captures one important way that states raise and contest
claims about custom in the international legal order.
As with all-states-benefit and hegemonic custom, it is custom’s charac-
teristics as unwritten, universal, and non-negotiated that make it a useful
instrument for states seeking to entrench a particular normative standard
of conduct in the international legal order. First, normative custom is con-
ducive to development through non-negotiated, tacit agreement. If for all-
states-benefit custom there is no reason for any particular state to object,
and if for hegemonic custom such objection would be futile, in the case of
normative custom, there are political and moral impediments to contesta-
tion. Stated another way, normative custom develops through tacit con-
sent if other nations feel morally or politically compelled not to speak out
against it. Unlike all-states-benefit custom, there may be high distribu-
tional costs to the rules of normative custom, but the costs of contesting
the rule are even higher.
Genocide and the death penalty provide useful opposing examples. A
1946 U.N. General Assembly Resolution prohibits genocide.134 The reso-
lution was adopted by a unanimous vote and no state representative pub-
licly maintained that genocide was permissible under international law.135
Now consider the death penalty. Many human rights advocates and some
states have argued that customary international law prohibits capital pun-
ishment. But, many other governments publically refute the existence of
such a custom, and some openly continue to impose and carry out death
sentences, thereby preventing the norm from becoming custom through
tacit consent.136 At some point, the combination of active endorsement
and tacit consent may become so widespread that a custom will form ex-
cept for a handful of persistent objector countries. For now, however, the
death penalty is not prohibited under CIL.
States seeking to develop normative custom may also be drawn to cus-
tom’s universal applicability, such as its ability to bind new states not in
existence when the norm developed and its ban on unilateral with-
drawal.137 In addition, some customary rules have attained the status of
jus cogens—non-derogable rules that can only be changed by another rule
of the same stature.138 States seeking to develop the normative bona fides
134. G.A. Res. 96 (I), The Crime of Genocide (Dec. 11, 1946).
135. See WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF
CRIMES 44–45 (2000).
136. Press Release, General Assembly, In Third Committee, Special Rapporteur on
Torture Calls on States to Seriously Reconsider Whether Death Penalty Amounts to Cruel,
Inhuman Treatment, U.N. Press Release GA/SHC/4046 (Oct. 23, 2012) (noting opposition
voiced by the United States, Singapore, Egypt, and other countries); see also Laurence E.
Rothenberg, International Law, U.S. Sovereignty, and the Death Penalty, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L.
547, 555–56 (2003–2004) (arguing that customary international law does not prohibit the
death penalty, in part because seventy–eight states permit the death penalty).
137. See generally Jacob Katz Cogan, Noncompliance and the International Rule of Law,
31 YALE J. INT’L L. 189 (2006) (discussing custom’s ban on unilateral withdrawal).
138. See Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34
YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 335–39 (2009).
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of a customary rule would be especially drawn to these features, which
help entrench the norm and make it valid against all nations in ways that
treaties and soft law do not.
Universality is also attractive for normative custom. States motivated
by other-regarding values likely want the norms they espouse to be ac-
cepted as broadly and deeply as possible. Anthea Roberts captures this
desire when analyzing custom that is derived from treaties: “Where the
treaty precedes the custom, the movement to custom often reflects recog-
nition of, or a desire to recognize, the core commitments as non-revocable
and binding on all states, thereby increasing their obligatory nature or
scope.”139 The same is true of normative custom more generally.
Consider the well-known example of the prohibition on torture. The
Convention against Torture is widely, but not universally, ratified.140 For
states that favor a global torture ban, instantiating such a ban in custom
binds all nations, and does not permit states to withdraw unilaterally, as
does the Convention. Some may challenge these assertions, citing the per-
sistent objector doctrine. Yet even if that doctrine remains available in
theory, its application to the prohibition on torture is especially unlikely.
The torture ban embodies very widely-held values, and it would be costly
for states to explicitly and openly reject such a prohibition. Theodor
Meron makes a similar observation about the normative anchoring effect
of custom when describing the dual protection of humanitarian norms:
“[The] consensus that the Geneva Conventions are declaratory of custom-
ary international law would strengthen the moral claim of the interna-
tional community for their observance because it would emphasize their
humanitarian underpinnings and deep roots in tradition and community
values.”141
Current controversies surrounding data privacy and mass surveillance
offer a different example—the potential emergence of new normative cus-
tom.142 Concerns about internet privacy and the collection of data have
been increasingly voiced by states and civil society organizations in various
multilateral venues. The U.N. General Assembly adopted two strongly
worded and widely supported resolutions on “the right to privacy in the
digital age” in 2013 and 2014.143 The Office of the U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights issued a report in June 2014 expressing strong
support for protecting data privacy and serious concern with mass surveil-
139. Anthea Roberts, Who Killed Article 38(1)(b)? A Reply to Bradley & Gulati, 21
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 173, 176–77 (2010).
140. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
141. Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. INT’L L.
348, 350 (1987).
142. Monika Zalnieriute, An International Constitutional Moment for Data Privacy in
the Times of Mass-Surveillance, 23 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 99, 101–03 (2015).
143. G.A. Res. 69/166 (Dec. 18, 2014); G.A. Res. 68/167 (Dec. 18, 2013).
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lance and retention of personal data.144 Most recently, in March 2015, the
U.N. Human Rights Council adopted by consensus a resolution—sup-
ported by 55 co-sponsors from different regions—appointing a new special
rapporteur to gather information on these same topics.145
Regional and national developments are bolstering these emerging
norms.146 Domestic legislation in a growing number of countries provides
a right to data privacy.147 In a landmark ruling in 2014, the European
Court of Justice invalidated the EU’s Data Retention Directive as an in-
fringement of the right to private life and protection of personal data.148
The following year, special representatives of the OSCE, OAS, and Afri-
can Union jointly condemned “[u]ntargeted or ‘mass’ surveillance [as] in-
herently disproportionate and . . . a violation of the rights to privacy and
freedom of expression,”149 and the Special Rapporteur of the Inter-Amer-
ican Commission on Human Rights called on the Unites States “to intro-
duce strong reforms to the NSA telephone metadata collection
program.”150
Much of the debate surrounding data privacy focuses on the applica-
tion of existing human rights norms to online settings, but it is framed in a
way that reiterates the legally binding nature of these norms.151 Some
144. U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Right to Privacy in the Digital
Age, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/37 (June 30, 2014).
145. G.A. Res. A/HRC/28/L.27 (Mar. 24, 2015).
146. See, e.g., Edward J. Snowden, Op-Ed., The World Says No to Surveillance, N.Y.
TIMES (June 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/05/opinion/edward-snowden-the-
world-says-no-to-surveillance.html?_r=0 (noting that “institutions across Europe have ruled
[mass surveillance] laws and operations [to be] illegal and imposed new restrictions on future
activities”).
147. Zalnieriute, supra note 142, at 116–20.
148. Joined Cases C-293/1 & C-594/12, Dig. Rights Ir. and Seitlinger v. Minister for
Comm., Marine and Nat. Res., 2014 E.C.R. I-23; see also Marie-Pierre Granger & Kristina
Irion, The Court of Justice and the Data Retention Directive in Digital Rights Ireland: Telling
Off the EU Legislator and Teaching a Lesson in Privacy and Data Protection, 39 EUR. L.
REV. 835, 841–49 (2014).
149. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression et al., Joint Dec-
laration on Freedom of Expression and Responses to Conflict Situations, ¶ 8(a) (May 4, 2015),
http://www.osce.org/fom/154846.
150. Press Release, Office of the Special Rapporteur of the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights [IACHR], The Office of the Special Rapporteur of the IACHR Calls
on the United States to Introduce Strong Reforms to the NSA Telephone Metadata Collec-
tion Program, U.N. Press Release R 50/15 (May 14, 2015).
151. See, e.g., Claude Moraes (Rapporteur), Eur. Parl. Comm. on C.L., Just. and Home
Aff., Draft Report on the US NSA Surveillance Programme, Surveillance Bodies in Various
Member States and Their Impact on EU Citizens’ Fundamental Rights and on Transatlantic
Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, at 11, 2013/2188(INI) (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www
.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML%2BCOMPARL%2BPE-
526.085%2B02%2BDOC%2BPDF%2BV0//EN (noting that mass surveillance may violate
the right to privacy, and other rights protected by the European Convention on Human
Rights); Ryan Goodman, International Law on Mass Foreign Surveillance: A Response to Ben
Wittes and Ashley Deeks, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 26, 2014, 12:01 PM), http://justsecurity.org/
8569/international-law-mass-foreign-surveillance-response-ben-wittes-ashley-deeks (arguing
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commentators have gone further, arguing that extant international custom
specifically protects a right of data privacy.152 Whether states ultimately
recognize customary law restrictions on mass data and surveillance will
depend in part on whether data privacy is widely understood as a funda-
mental right, such that the political or moral costs of objecting to such a
rule are too high to incur. We thus expect any custom that emerges from
this process to rely heavily on tacit consent, with some governments taking
strongly supportive positions and others acquiescing. Such a custom is also
likely to be vague, deferring many questions about specific applications of
the norm.
A possible impediment to the emergence of a data privacy custom
would be objections by nations which, as a result of their more advanced
technological capabilities, will incur higher costs of international regula-
tion. Such opposition may, however, be weakened or even defused if a
group of relatively powerful states actively supports the custom—a dy-
namic suggested by recent sparring over data privacy resolutions in the
United Nations.153 Hegemons may also turn to custom for a different rea-
son—because they disagree with the capacious soft law norms advocated
by human rights NGOs and experts and seek to develop competing (and
more state-friendly) legal rules regarding data privacy.
D. Custom’s Overlapping Domains
Extrapolating from the design features that constrain the formation of
CIL, this Section has argued that custom has three principal domains:
norms that benefit all states, norms backed by visible commitments from
powerful nations, and custom that reflects shared normative values. Inter-
national norms or potential norms that fall outside these domains are not
well-suited for regulation via custom. For example, when a custom be-
comes increasingly distributional in effect, or when it loses the backing of
a powerful (enough) hegemon, states are likely to shift to more negotiated
forms of international cooperation. The shift from absolute to restrictive
immunity is an example of the first, and the decline of the Hull doctrine
due to opposition from newly independent states is an illustration of the
second.
What we have labeled as domains might, however, also be conceptual-
ized as a set of overlapping and interactive factors that tend to make the
formation of custom more likely. For example, even if a putative custom-
that mass foreign surveillance may violate the right to privacy under customary international
law).
152. See Zalnieriute, supra note 142, at 116–20, 132.
153. Germany and Brazil are two relatively powerful nations that supported robust data
privacy norms by sponsoring the 2013 U.N. General Assembly resolution on digital privacy.
The United States supported the resolution, but only after it unsuccessfully lobbied for
weaker language. Jonathan Horowitz & Sarah Knuckey, Major New United Nations Report
Rebukes Five Eyes’ Attempts to Weaken Digital Privacy Rights, JUST SECURITY (July 23, 2014,
9:19 AM), http://justsecurity.org/13158/major-united-nations-report-rebukes-eyes-attempts-
weaken-digital-privacy-rights/.
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ary norm has distributional impact, a stronger, visible commitment from
powerful countries may nevertheless spur its formation. All other things
equal, the stronger the distributional effect, the greater the projection of
power required.
Hegemons may also spur the formation of international rules that re-
flect deeply held normative values even if those rules also have distribu-
tional consequences. The Nuremberg Tribunal provides an illustration of
such a hybrid hegemonic-normative custom. Together, the Tribunal and
the Charter that created it,154 their reception by states, and the subsequent
affirmation of their principles by the U.N. General Assembly,155 estab-
lished individual criminal responsibility as part of CIL.156 These develop-
ments were unquestionably driven by the visible commitments of the
victors of World War II—the United States, France, the United Kingdom
and the Soviet Union.157 The Nuremberg Tribunal corresponded to
widely-held normative values: the atrocities committed in World War II
were unprecedented in scale and brutality, generating universal condem-
nation and widespread sense that perpetrators should be held legally
accountable.158
The influential Tadic´ decision by the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)159 illustrates how a hybrid normative-
hegemonic custom can arise notwithstanding its potential distributional ef-
fects. The ICTY Appeals Chamber in that case held that war crimes liabil-
ity for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions applies not only to
armed conflicts between states but also to internal and non-international
armed conflicts.160 The judges purported to simply restate a preexisting
customary rule, but the evidence they cited for that proposition was very
thin.161 The decision did, however, prompt subsequent state practice that
crystalized into customary international law.162
Tadic´ unquestionably had a normative component, which the Appeals
Chamber emphasized in asserting that civilians in all types of armed con-
flicts should be protected from egregious conduct such as rape, torture, or
154. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 1, Aug. 8, 1945, 82
U.N.T.S. 280.
155. G.A. Res. 3, at 3(I) (Feb. 13, 1946).
156. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Constitu-
tional Moment, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 13–15 (2002); SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 104, at 64–68.
157. See SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 104, at 64–66.
158. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2556 (1991) (noting that prosecutions in an
international court were justified because the conduct “offended humanity itself”).
159. Prosecutor v. Tadic´, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interloc-
utory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
160. Id. ¶ 77.
161. Id.; see, e.g., Geoffrey Watson, The Humanitarian Law of the Yugoslavia War
Crimes Tribunal: Jurisdiction in Prosecutor v. Tadic´, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 687, 699 (1996).
162. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 104, at 151–52.
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the wanton destruction of hospitals.163 Yet, the Tadic´ rule also imposes
greater costs on states that regularly experience civil wars or other armed
conflicts within their borders. Under the Tadic´ rule, these states face po-
tential war crimes prosecutions for their conduct in such conflicts; without
the Tadic´ rule, they did not. This may explain the earlier opposition of
developing countries to war crimes liability in non-international armed
conflicts.164 In addition, countries such China, India, Pakistan, and Russia
opposed incorporating the Tadic´ rule into the International Criminal
Court Statute in 1998.165 Ultimately, this position was rejected, and the
U.N. Security Council later endorsed the Tadic´ rule (at least tacitly) in
resolutions concerning international crimes committed in Libya,166 Sierra
Leone,167 and Rwanda.168 By 2011, opposition to Tadic´ had dissipated fur-
ther, with India, China, and Russia all voting in favor of a U.N. Security
Council resolution asking the ICC to investigate the “serious violations of
international humanitarian law” committed during the civil war in
Libya.169 No government criticized the referral on the grounds that poten-
tial war crimes had been committed during a non-international armed con-
flict.170 According to one commentator, this silence may reflect a desire by
developing countries to avoid “pick[ing] a fight with an institution estab-
lished by the powerful Security Council.”171 In sum, the distributional con-
sequences of Tadic´ were overcome by the confluence of normative and
hegemonic support for the rule as international custom.
IV. THE FUTURE OF CUSTOM IN AN AGE OF SOFT LAW AND TREATIES
Having described custom’s unique features and mapped its domains,
we turn to a discussion of custom’s relationship to treaties and soft law.
This relationship might be understood as complementary: custom can be
seen as a fungible form of “soft” hard law or “hard” soft law that exists on
a continuum between soft law and treaties. Such a framing suggests that
163. Prosecutor v. Tadic´, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defense Motion for Interlocu-
tory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 97 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
164. Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make Law: How International Criminal
Tribunals Recast the Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1, 45 (2006) (“The political losers from
the ICTY’s revision of the laws of war appear to be developing countries. Their hostility to
extending the rules to civil wars is manifest in the records from the 1949 and 1974–77 Diplo-
matic Conferences.”).
165. See Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l Criminal Court, Report
of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, at 16,
U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (Sept. 6, 1995); SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
104, at 151–52.
166. S.C. Res. 1970, ¶¶ 4–8 (Feb. 26, 2011).
167. S.C. Res. 1315, ¶¶ 7–8 (Aug. 14, 2000).
168. S.C. Res. 955, annex (Nov. 8, 1994).
169. S.C. Res. 1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
170. See SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 104, at 152–53.
171. Id. at 153 (quoting Danner, supra note 164, at 44).
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custom may be rendered obsolete as unwritten international norms are
codified and soft law grows in scope and complexity.172
We recognize that custom sometimes functions as a complement to
treaties or soft law, as the literatures on legalization and instrument choice
at times suggest. But, the distinctive (and less malleable) characteristics of
custom, as compared to soft law and treaties, create continuing incentives
for states to choose custom over the other legal instruments if doing so
advances their respective national interests or shapes the content, scope,
or application of international rules in ways that favor them. If this ac-
count is correct, the demand for custom will not be affected by whether a
particular subject area becomes more heavily populated by treaties and/or
soft law.
We argue that there are two overarching rationales for states to
choose custom over treaties and/or soft law: preferable substantive norms
or preferable design features. States dissatisfied with the content of non-
binding norms or treaty provisions might, for example, attempt to develop
alternative customary rules with different substantive obligations. Or
states might agree with the substance of a treaty or soft law, but turn to
custom because of its distinctive design features, such as its preclusion of
the ability to “opt-out” by non-ratifications, treaty withdrawals, or
reservations.
We represent the two dimensions of the choice between custom on the
one hand and treaties and soft law in Figure 1 below. The legal instru-
ments that are alternatives to custom appear on the x-axis, and the two
rationales for states to choose custom are listed on the y-axis. The diagram
depicts custom that arises later in time than treaties or soft law.173 We
focus on this temporal relationship because we view it as a more signifi-
cant challenge to custom’s continuing relevance to international coopera-
tion. To be sure, as Tim Meyer has shown, custom that develops first may
lead states that prefer codified legal norms to advocate, for example, for
ILC-generated conventions or draft articles.174 Yet if states continue to
prefer custom—even in areas replete with treaties or nonbinding norms—
such a choice casts doubt on predictions of custom’s demise in an age of
soft law and treaties, and on commentators who discount CIL’s role in
international cooperation.
172. See Trachtman, The Growing Obsolescence of Customary International Law, supra
note 4, at 174 (“CIL is largely superseded by treaty law and other codification; that is, only in
very few circumstances are there CIL rules of law that have not been reflected in treaty or
other codification.”); VILLIGER, supra note 19, at 151 (citation omitted) (discussing the view
that “multilateral conventions tend to drive out customary law”).
173. We acknowledge, of course, that it can sometimes be difficult to determine
whether a custom crystalized before or after a treaty embodying the same or similar norms.
See North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Den./Neth. v. Ger.), 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 44 (Feb. 20).
174. See Meyer, Codifying Custom, supra note 5, at 1025 (arguing that states sometimes
codify custom in order to change its terms); see also Laurence R. Helfer & Timothy Meyer,
The Evolution of Codification: A Principal–Agent Theory of the International Law Commis-
sion’s Influence, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE, supra note 3, at 314–22 (documenting the increasing
prevalence of non-treaty ILC outputs).
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FIGURE 1: TYPOLOGY OF ADVANTAGES OF CUSTOM OVER
TREATIES/SOFT LAW
Design features Substantive norms
Treaties • Geneva Conventions for • Common heritage of
the Protection of Victims of mankind principle, as CIL,
War, as CIL, bind states supplants 1958 Geneva High
parties that reserve to or Seas Convention on the
withdraw from the exploitation of non-living
Conventions resources on the deep seabed
• Provisions of multilateral • In Tadic´, ICTY extends
treaties, such as the war crimes to non-
Convention on the international armed conflicts;
International Sale of Goods U.N. members later accept
and the VCLT, bind non- this as CIL
parties as CIL • Claims that CIL permits
•  U.S., a non-party to humanitarian intervention
UNCLOS, asserts that even if not authorized by the
selected UNCLOS provisions U.N. Charter and the
reflect CIL Security Council
Soft law • Advocates of a global ban • U.K. reasserts right to
on antipersonnel landmines unilateral humanitarian
argue that the ban is CIL; intervention as CIL in Syria
U.S. and other retentionist and rejects the soft law R2P
nations accept only principle
nonbinding pledges toward • CIL competes with
such a ban nonbinding World Bank
• Dispute over whether 2002 Guidelines over standard of
ASEAN Declaration on compensation for
South China Sea is CIL and expropriated alien property
limits China’s activities there
A. Custom’s Advantages over Treaties: Design Features
The top left box illustrates situations in which states turn to custom to
modify or obviate the design features of preexisting international agree-
ments. A prominent illustration of custom that competes with treaty de-
sign features is the protection of civilians in CIL and also in the 1949
Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War. Theodor
Meron has argued that the protection of civilians in customary law is im-
portant in part because custom, unlike the Geneva Conventions, does not
permit unilateral withdrawal and because “reservations to the Conven-
tions may not affect the obligations of the parties under provisions reflect-
ing customary law to which they would be subject independently of the
Conventions.”175 Meron also notes that “as customary law, the norms ex-
pressed in the Conventions might be subject to a process of interpretation
175. Meron, supra note 141, at 349.
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different from that which applies to treaties”176—a further indication of
custom’s continuing relevance.
The protection of civilians is a hard case for our theory because the
Geneva Conventions have been universally ratified, which some might
claim renders custom irrelevant. More common but still supportive exam-
ples are multilateral agreements—such as the Convention on the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties—
at least some provisions of which are accepted as having attained the sta-
tus of CIL, thus permitting their application to countries that have re-
frained from ratifying those instruments.177
A different use of custom to work around treaty design features is
provided by the United States’ relationship to the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The United States played a lead role in nego-
tiating UNCLOS, but has never ratified the Convention. It has, however,
consistently maintained that some aspects of the Convention—in particu-
lar, those concerning freedom of navigation—reflect customary interna-
tional law.178 Critically for our purposes, the United States recognizes that
the navigation rules embodied in these two sources of law are substan-
tively the same.179 However, because UNCLOS does not permit reser-
vations,180 it precludes treaty parties from opting out from any
of its substantive provisions—including provisions, such as UNCLOS’
dispute settlement clauses, to which the United States objects. By
remaining outside of the Convention while selectively adhering to some
of its provisions as custom, the United States is, controversially,
using CIL to pick and choose those aspects of UNCLOS that benefit it
while avoiding the concomitant burdens of provisions it disfavors181—
176. Id.
177. See LARRY A. DIMATTEO, LUCIEN J. DHOOGE, STEPHANIE GREENE, VIRGINIA G.
MAURER & MARISA ANNE PAGNATTARO, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A CRITICAL ANALY-
SIS OF CISG JURISPRUDENCE 13–18 (2005). For example, the United States is a non-party to
the VCLT but accepts many of its core provisions as customary international law. See U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties: Frequently Asked Questions
(last visited Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (“The United
States considers many of the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to
constitute customary international law on the law of treaties.”).
178. S. Res. 183, 114th Cong. (2015), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/sres183/
text (stating that the United States Government is committed to “upholding internationally
lawful uses of the high seas and the Exclusive Economic Zones as well as to the related rights
and freedoms in other maritime zones, including the rights of innocent passage, transit pas-
sage, and archipelagic sea lanes passage consistent with customary international law.”).
179. OFFICE OF FED. REG., STATEMENT ON UNITED STATES OCEAN POLICY, 1 PUBLIC
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 378 (Mar. 10, 1983); George Haimbaugh, Jr., Impact of the Rea-
gan Administration on the Law of the Sea, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 151, 188 (1989).
180. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 309, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397.
181. U.S. strategy has generated vociferous objections, in particular from China. E.g.,
James W. Houck, Alone on a Wide Wide Sea: A National Security Rationale for Joining the
Law of the Sea Convention, 1 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 1, 4 (2012) (“The Chinese have
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precisely what the no reservations clause of UNCLOS was adopted to
prevent.182
B. Custom’s Advantages over Treaties: Substantive Norms
The box in the upper right quadrant of Figure 1 depicts situations in
which states choose custom over treaties because they prefer CIL’s sub-
stantive norms.183 A different area of international maritime law provides
a “[s]triking example[ ] of modification” of a treaty through custom.184
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas recognized the freedom of
states parties to unilaterally exploit non-living resources on the deep sea-
bed.185 Yet in the years following the Convention’s adoption, a competing
principle—the “common heritage of mankind”—emerged and rapidly
crystalized as custom.186 Pursuant to this principle, a state could exploit
seabed resources only when acting as an agent of the international com-
munity as a whole.187 Importantly, the common heritage idea arose in part
from legal claims by non-parties to the Geneva High Seas Convention,
claims that would have gained little if any traction as treaty revisions, but
boldly rejected long–standing U.S. positions on customary international law and also chal-
lenged conventional interpretations of critical UNCLOS provisions.”).
182. Alan Beesley, The Negotiating Strategy of UNCLOS III: Developing and Devel-
oped Countries as Partners: A Pattern for Future Multilateral International Conferences?, 46
LAW & CONT. PROBS. 183, 185 (1983) (stating that “we did not want to make it possible . . .
for a state to opt into those parts of the Convention they liked while opting out of those they
did not like”).
183. On the question of whether treaties may be modified by custom or whether they
may only be modified by a treaty amendment or a new treaty, see VILLIGER, supra note 19,
at 195–204. Villiger convincingly argues that new customary rules may mean that “[t]he writ-
ten rule accordingly undergo[es] amendment or modification or even completely pass[es] out
of use.” Id. at 195; see also JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 136–43
(2003). Interpretation of a treaty based on the subsequent practice of the parties, as provided
for under Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, may be at times
difficult to distinguish from modification of a treaty via custom. See VILLIGER, supra note 19,
at 201.
184. VILLIGER, supra note 19, at 202. For other examples of treaties that were renegoti-
ated in light of subsequently-developed custom, see NANCY KONTOU, THE TERMINATION
AND REVISION OF TREATIES IN THE LIGHT OF NEW CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
37–107 (1994).
185. Geneva Convention on the High Seas art. 24, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 6465
(obligating states to prevent pollution resulting from “the exploitation and exploration of the
seabed and its subsoil,” thereby implicitly permitting such activities).
186. See Ru¨diger Wolfrum, The Principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 43
ZEITSCHRIFT FU¨R AUSLA¨NDISCHES O¨FFENTLICHES RECHT UND VO¨LKERRECHT 312, 333–37
(1983). But cf. Christopher C. Joyner & Detlev Vagts, The Convention on the Regulation of
Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities: An Attempt to Break New Ground, 87 AM. J. INT’L L.
360, 361 (1993) (book review) (questioning whether the common heritage of mankind princi-
ple had attained the status of customary international law).
187. See Wolfrum, supra note 186, at 316–17.
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were far more salient as efforts to develop new CIL applicable to all
nations.188
The Tadic´ decision, discussed above in the context of custom’s over-
lapping domains, provides another example of the substantive advantages
of a custom over treaties that regulate the same subject area. The Geneva
Conventions themselves apply almost exclusively to international armed
conflicts,189 leaving other military hostilities largely unregulated by the
laws of war (with only a few exceptions, such as Common Article 3).190 In
Tadic´, the ICTY held that certain provisions in the Conventions apply to
internal armed conflicts as a matter of CIL.191 In effect, the decision in-
voked custom to expand the Geneva Conventions’ substantive norms to
non-international armed conflicts. In the decades that followed, states in-
creasingly embraced Tadic´’s substantive expansion of the customary laws
of war beyond what the Geneva Conventions themselves require. Interest-
ingly, states had previously considered and rejected precisely such an ex-
pansion when negotiating Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in the
1970s.192
Humanitarian intervention offers another illustration of this relation-
ship. The U.N. Charter prohibits the unilateral use of force in response to
humanitarian crises in the absence of U.N. Security Council authorization
or plausible claims of self-defense.193 Yet as recent world events have
made painfully clear, U.N. Security Council approval is often blocked by
political differences among that body’s five veto-wielding permanent
members. As discussed in greater detail below,194 some states dissatisfied
with the status quo have turned to customary international law, implicitly
or explicitly, to justify a military response to humanitarian crises if the
U.N. Security Council fails to act. Such states are, in effect, claiming that
custom offers a superior substantive norm that should displace the sub-
stantive constraints of the U.N. Charter.
188. Malta, which became a state in 1964, did not accede to the 1958 Geneva High Seas
Convention and was a strong proponent of the common heritage principle. See Lieutenant
Martin A. Harry, The Deep Seabed: The Common Heritage of Mankind or Arena for Unilat-
eral Exploitation?, 40 NAVAL L. REV. 207, 209–10 (1992). Pardo’s speech set off a chain of
events, which eventually led to the conclusion of UNCLOS in 1983. See ROBERT L.
FRIEDHEIM, NEGOTIATING THE NEW OCEAN REGIME 29–40 (1993).
189. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
190. Id. art. 3.
191. See infra text at notes 159–162; see also Major Timothy P. Bulman, A Dangerous
Guessing Game Disguised as Enlightened Policy: United States Law of War Obligations Dur-
ing Military Operations Other Than War, 159 MIL. L. REV. 152, 162–63 (1999).
192. Danner, supra note 164, at 50–51.
193. See generally Vaughan Lowe & Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Humanitarian Interven-
tion, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011).
194. See infra Part IV.D.
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C. Custom’s Advantages over Soft Law: Design Features
The box on the lower left of Figure 1 depicts situations in which cus-
tom and soft law share the same substantive norms but have different de-
sign characteristics. The principal difference is obvious—CIL is legally
binding and nonbinding norms are not. But there are other differences as
well. Soft law is easier and faster to create and modify than custom, mak-
ing it useful for situations of uncertainty and experimentation where flexi-
bility is prized. Whether states can alter an existing customary rule without
violating it is a question that has long bedeviled scholars. Deviating from
soft law incurs no international legal responsibility and no (or at least
lower) political and reputational costs, neatly sidestepping these
difficulties.
Notwithstanding these design differences, many commentators assert
that soft law’s primary relationship to custom is as a precursor for hard
law. As Christine Chinkin explains this view, “[o]nce a prospective norm
has been formulated in soft form it can become a catalyst for the develop-
ment of customary international law. To many commentators this is the
raison d’eˆtre of soft law and its entry point into the traditional sources of
law.”195 Implicit in this perspective is the belief that states become habitu-
ated to nonbinding norms over time, eventually accepting them as CIL.
The canonical example is the path to custom followed by the rights in the
nonbinding Universal Declaration of Human Rights.196
This perspective overlooks, however, the possibility of ongoing com-
petition among states over the choice between custom and soft law. Con-
sider, for example, the ongoing effort to ban anti-personnel land mines.
The United States has signed or otherwise supported soft law instruments
calling for a ban on these weapons. In 1996, the United States pledged its
support for a total ban on landmines.197 Five years later, it supported a
nonbinding declaration that “all States should strive towards the eventual
elimination of anti-personnel landmines globally,”198 and, in 2014, it an-
nounced a voluntarily ban on landmines, except on the Korean Penin-
sula.199 Yet, the United States and a small group of other countries
195. Christine Chinkin, Normative Development in the International Legal System, in
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 48, at 32.
196. See, e.g., Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287, 317–36 (1995–96); Rich-
ard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary International Human Rights Law, 25
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 1–4 (1995–96).
197. See Rachel Good, Yes We Should: Why the U.S. Should Change Its Policy Toward
the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, 9 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 209, 216 (2011).
198. See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, I CUSTOMARY INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 282–83 (2005) (quoting Final Declaration by States Party to
the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons at the Second Review Conference in
2001).
199. The United States has also said that it is working toward accession of the Anti-
Landmine Convention, although it has no immediate plans for ratification. See Felicia
Schwartz, U.S. Moves Closer to Compliance with Treaty Banning Land Mines, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-moves-closer-to-compliance-with-treaty-
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continue to maintain that international law does not prohibit their use of
anti-personnel landmines.200 Consistent with that position, these nations
are not parties to the Anti-Landmine Convention.201 As a result of these
assertions and non-ratifications, there is no customary rule prohibiting the
use of anti-personnel landmines, although some observers believe that
such a rule is already in the process of developing, based in part on the
large number of parties to the Convention.202 The United States has been
willing, in other words, to endorse only hortatory pledges in favor of elimi-
nating landmines, while rejecting any binding international rules.
Meanwhile, advocates supporting a global ban have sought to bind
these holdout states through custom,203 and abolitionist nations have sig-
naled, in changes to U.N. General Assembly resolutions, a desire to make
the ban universally applicable.204 Stated differently, the core design fea-
tures that distinguish soft law and custom are precisely the object of con-
testation between countries that seek an immediate, binding prohibition
on the use of anti-personnel landmines and those that seek more flexible,
longer-term pledges to work voluntarily toward a reduction of those
weapons.
Another possible example concerns the dispute over territorial waters
in the South China Sea. China’s attempt to bolster its maritime claims by
constructing artificial islands and reefs has triggered vociferous objections
not only from Southeast Asian nations with competing maritime claims,
but also from Japan and the United States. The latter countries’ officials
have asserted that China is not “observ[ing] international rules” and mak-
banning-land-mines-1411509618; Ryan Kocse, Final Detonation: How Customary Interna-
tional Law Can Trigger the End of Landmines, 103 GEO. L.J. 749, 776–77 (2015).
200. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 198, at 282–83. Other countries
maintaining the right to use anti-personnel landmines include China, Pakistan, South Korea,
and Russia. Id. at 282 n.12.
201. As of July 2015, the Anti-Landmine Convention has 162 State Parties. Convention
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines
and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211. Other non-parties include
China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Israel, Pakistan, South Korea, and Russia. See id.
202. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 198, at 282; Peter Herby & Kath-
leen Lawand, Unacceptable Behavior: How Norms are Established, in BANNING LANDMINES:
DISARMAMENT, CITIZEN DIPLOMACY, AND HUMAN SECURITY 199, 207–08 (Jody Williams et
al. eds., 2008); see also Kocse, supra note 199, at 770 (arguing that CIL prohibits the export of
anti-personnel landmines and other specific conduct related to landmines).
203. Human Rights Watch maintains that the use of anti-personnel landmines violates
customary international law. Libya: Evidence of New Landmine Use in Tripoli, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/04/libya-evidence-new-land
mine-use-tripoli.
204. See Kocse, supra note 199, at 778–80 (quoting G.A. Res. 69/34 at 2, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/69/34 (Dec. 2, 2014)) (noting that, beginning in 2010, annual U.N. General Assembly
resolutions on landmines added a provision “[e]mphasizing the desirability of attracting the
adherence of all States to the Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the
promotion of its universalization and norms”).
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ing unilateral claims “through means other than . . . international law.”205
Although the specific international obligations that China is ignoring re-
main unstated, one possible source of such obligations is the 2002 Declara-
tion on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, in which China and
other littoral countries “undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct
of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace
and stability including . . . refraining from action of inhabiting on the pres-
ently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features . . . .”206
When adopted in 2002, the Declaration was unquestionably nonbind-
ing.207 But some commentators have suggested that it may be declaratory
of an emerging regional custom.208 The foreign ministry’s dismissive re-
sponse to its critics, in contrast, emphasizes the lack of any binding inter-
national rule (treaty or custom) that prohibits China’s actions:
The international law has been constantly brought up by some
countries when it comes to the South China Sea issue. If they did
read closely the international law, then please tell us which article
in the international law forbids China to carry out justified con-
struction on its own islands and reefs?209
Assuming for purposes of argument that the governments opining on
the South China Sea controversy are at least implicitly sparring over the
legal status of the 2002 Declaration, the statements by Japan and the
United States can be seen as a bid to legalize a substantive standard of
conduct that China has expressly assented to only as a hortatory pledge
that can be easily ignored. Conversely, China’s rejoinder asserts that no
international rules proscribe its actions. Stated differently, the core design
features that distinguish soft law and custom are precisely the object of
dispute between the parties to the South China Sea dispute.
205. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference (June
3, 2015) [hereinafter Hua Chunying Press Conference], http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1269971.shtml.
206. Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea para. 5, Nov. 4,
2002, http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/2002%20Declaration%20on%20the%20Conduct%20of%20
Parties%20in%20the%20South%20China%20Sea-pdf.pdf.
207. See Nguyen Hong Thao, The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea: A Note, 34 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 279, 281 (2003) (“The [Declaration] is
not a legal instrument and thus is technically not legally binding.”); See also Robert C. Beck-
man, Legal Regimes for Cooperation in the South China Sea, in SECURITY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL POLITICS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: TOWARDS A COOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT
REGIME 222, 228 (Sam Bateman & Ralf Emmers, eds., 2009) (characterizing the 2002 Decla-
ration as confirming that territorial disputes will be resolved consistently with international
law).
208. See, e.g., Wendy N. Duong, Following the Path of Oil: The Law of the Sea or Real-
politik—What Good Does Law Do in the South China Sea Territorial Conflict?, 30 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 1098, 1173 (2006) (describing the 2002 Declaration as either soft or customary
international law).
209. Hua Chunying Press Conference, supra note 205.
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D. Custom’s Advantages over Soft Law: Substantive Norms
The lower right quadrant of Figure 1 depicts situations in which CIL
and soft law contain different substantive standards. States that turn to
custom in these settings do so because they disagree with the content of a
nonbinding norm. Consider the example of humanitarian intervention, dis-
cussed above in the context of competition between custom and the U.N.
Charter. In 1999, NATO countries bombed Serbian forces in Kosovo with-
out U.N. Security Council authorization, seeking to prevent mass atroci-
ties against the Kosovar Albanians.210 NATO’s actions triggered a wave of
soft law norm creation involving humanitarian intervention. The most am-
bitious soft law instrument, drafted by scholars and diplomats on the Inter-
national Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS),
articulated a new principle—the responsibility to protect (R2P)—that em-
phasized the duty of all nations to protect civilians at risk and suggested
that states might, in exceptional circumstances, use force even absent U.N.
Security Council approval.211 In the decade that followed, proponents of
R2P sought to bolster this principle and its application to a range of hu-
manitarian crises.212 However, when states themselves endorsed the R2P
at the 2005 World Summit, they expressly rejected language suggesting
that force could be used without U.N. Security Council authorization.213
The recent controversy over whether to use force in response to the
atrocities in the civil war in Syria reveals the continuing competition
among states over soft law and CIL in this area. The United Kingdom is a
proponent of humanitarian intervention in Syria. The government did not,
however, advance that claim by relying on the nonbinding R2P principle.
Instead, it turned to custom. A 2014 letter from the Foreign and Common-
wealth Office drew a sharp distinction between the “legal basis of humani-
tarian intervention and the concept of the responsibility to protect.”214
Eschewing R2P, the United Kingdom cited prior uses of force without
U.N. Security Council approval—Kosovo in 1999, the Kurds in Northern
Iraq in 1991, and the no fly zones in Northern and Southern Iraq from
1991.215 The United Kingdom reaffirmed this position with respect to
210. Leslie Burton, Kosovo: To Bomb or Not to Bomb? The Legality is the Question, 7
ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 49, 49 (2001); INDEP. INT’L COMM’N ON KOSOVO, KOSOVO
REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 33–99 (2000).
211. See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBIL-
ITY TO PROTECT §§ 6.28–40 (2001).
212. See, e.g., GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: ENDING MASS
ATROCITY CRIMES ONCE AND FOR ALL (2009); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE RESPONSI-
BILITY TO PROTECT (Alex Bellamy & Tim Dunne, eds.) (forthcoming 2016).
213. G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138–39 (Oct. 24, 2005); see also Thomas G. Weiss, R2P After 9/
11 and the World Summit, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 741, 759–60 (2006).
214. Letter from the Rt. Hon. Hugh Robertson MP, Minister of State, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect at 5
(Jan. 14, 2014), http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Letter-from-UK-Foreign-
Commonwealth-Office-to-the-House-of-Commons-Foreign-Affairs-Committee-on-Humani-
tarian-Intervention-and-the-Responsibility-to-Protect.pdf.
215. Id. at 3.
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Syria, arguing that “intervention may be permitted under international law
in exceptional circumstances where the U.N. Security Council is unwilling
or unable to act in order to avert a humanitarian catastrophe . . . .”216
This example also illustrates a gap in the existing literature on instru-
ment choice. In a recent study of the international security regime, Greg-
ory Shaffer and Mark Pollack offer a lengthy analysis of humanitarian
intervention. They characterize nonbinding norms, including instruments
adopting R2P, as a “pathway to revising hard law,” apparently conflating
custom and treaties.217 But the United Kingdom’s position with respect to
Syria is at odds with this approach. The United Kingdom has not framed
its options as a choice between soft law and hard law; rather, it has in-
voked custom as an alternative to both the U.N. Charter and the nonbind-
ing R2P principle. Our framework also correctly predicts how the United
Kingdom would seek to develop this custom—by the projection of power
and by raising normative arguments.
A different example involves the compensation due when a state ex-
propriates the property of foreign investors. As we explained above when
discussing hegemonic custom, in the first half of the 20th century CIL ar-
guably reflected the Hull Doctrine requirement of “adequate, effective,
and prompt” compensation.218 Developing countries attempted to change
this rule in the 1960s and 1970s via the adoption of several U.N. General
Assembly resolutions.219 By the 1980s, many commentators argued that
the Hull Doctrine no longer reflected CIL.220 In response, industrialized
countries, led by the United States and Europe, sought to codify the doc-
trine in a proposed multilateral convention (that ultimately failed) and (far
more successfully) in thousands of bilateral investment treaties (BITs).221
At roughly the same time, the World Bank promulgated soft law Guide-
lines that require only “appropriate” compensation. But the Guidelines
also stipulated that compensation according to the Hull Doctrine meets
this standard, and they offered definitions of the key terms prompt, ade-
quate, and effective.222
216. Id. The United Kingdom articulated three conditions for such intervention. See id.
at 5.
217. Shaffer & Pollack, Hard Versus Soft Law in International Security, supra note 9, at
1221, 1277.
218. See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text.
219. G.A. Res. 17/1803 ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803(XVII) (Dec. 14, 1962); G.A. Res.
29/3281, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281(XXIX) (Dec. 12, 1974); Lee Connor, Comment, The Inter-
national Law of Expropriation of Foreign–Owned Property: The Compensation Requirement
and the Role of the Taking State, 6 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 355, 360–62 (1983).
220. Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign Investors
Before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1550, 1559–64
(2009).
221. Id.; see JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 97 (4th ed. 2015).
222. World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, 31 INT’L
LEGAL MATERIALS 1379 (1992); see also IBRAHIM SHIHATA, THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 40–43, 63–64, 88–90, 110–12 (1993).
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The United States opposed the Guidelines’ more flexible approach to
compensation.223 In part to neutralize the influence of this soft law instru-
ment, the United States adopted a model BIT and negotiated a series of
BITs with developing countries based on that model.224 Eager to attract
investment, developing nations generally accepted these terms, including
the Hull standard.225 Today, these bilateral investment treaties are, in
turn, cited as evidence of custom.226 If such custom arises in the future, it
will bind all states, not just those which are parties to the BITs.
In the two examples discussed above, why did the United States and
the United Kingdom turn to CIL (as well as treaties) instead of engaging
with the soft law precedents of the World Bank Guidelines and the R2P
principle? The divergence between the substantive standards of custom
and nonbinding norms is surely part of the answer. By the late 1990s, the
United States had battled developing countries over expropriated prop-
erty for more than half a century. It ultimately succeeded in incorporating
its preferred compensation standard into numerous BITs, which it could
plausibly envision being recognized as international custom. To support
the World Bank Guidelines could have jeopardized this initiative, leading
the Guidelines, not the Hull Doctrine, to crystalize into CIL.
A similar strategy may explain the United Kingdom’s reliance on cus-
tom, rather than the R2P principle, to assert a right to unilateral humanita-
rian intervention when the U.N. Security Council is deadlocked. As noted
above, the latter principle was developed and championed by independent
experts and advocacy groups. Although states have endorsed the principle
in the abstract in a few U.N. resolutions, its substantive content remains
unsettled—especially with regard to whether a prior U.N. Security Coun-
cil resolution authorizing force is required. By appealing to CIL rather
than soft law, the United Kingdom may have been seeking to assert
greater control over the normative evolution of humanitarian intervention
than would be possible if it had contributed to the more open-ended and
less state-centric processes of soft law development.
223. SHIHATA, supra note 222, at 110 (“In particular, the U.S. note argued that the
standard of compensation should be the Hull formula.”).
224. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2012 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL IN-
VESTMENT TREATY, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20
Meeting.pdf; see infra note 226.
225. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and International Law, 42
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 123, 127 (2003) (explaining that “[i]n droves the developing coun-
tries signed up to” BITs that included “rules concerning expropriation and compensation
very close to the previously hated Hull Rule”).
226. DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 221, at 96–97 (quoting CME Czech
Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Final Award, Mar. 13, 2004); see also Lowenfeld, supra
note 225, at 128–30; Stephen M. Schwebel, The Influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties on
Customary International Law, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 27, 27 (2004) (“Customary inter-
national law governing the treatment of foreign investment has been reshaped to embody the
principles of law found in more than two thousand concordant bilateral investment trea-
ties.”). The use of BITs as evidence of custom has been controversial. See generally, Alvarez,
A Bit on Custom, supra note 3, at 24–27.
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The evolving norms of humanitarian intervention also illustrate a final
point about the continuing demand for custom in an age of soft law or
treaties: such demand is constrained by the factors we identified in Part
III. In particular, an analysis based on custom’s domains suggests that,
given the strong distributional effects of international rules on the use
force, the confluence of normative and hegemonic custom explains why
some states are choosing CIL to create new humanitarian intervention.
The United States and the United Kingdom are powerful countries,
supporting hegemonic custom. Humanitarian intervention also has a
strong normative component. The United Kingdom relied in part on nor-
mative arguments in its 2013 statement on the use of force in Syria. The
United Kingdom maintained that “[i]f action in the Security Council is
blocked, the UK would still be permitted under international law to take
exceptional measures in order to alleviate the scale of the overwhelming
humanitarian catastrophe in Syria by deterring and disrupting the further
use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. Such a legal basis is availa-
ble, under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.”227 President
Obama defended potential military intervention in Syria in part by asking
“[w]hat message will we send if a dictator can gas hundreds of children to
death in plain sight and pay no price?”228 Although it is still unclear
whether the confluence of hegemonic and normative pressures will lead to
the formation of a new customary rule,229 this example aptly illustrates not
only the incentives that states have to choose custom as an alternative to
treaties, but also the difficulty of operating with custom’s domains.
V. CONCLUSION
What is the place of customary international law in the changing land-
scape of contemporary international lawmaking? Notwithstanding wide-
spread predictions that CIL is dying, and repeated efforts to revive or
reform it, there has been surprisingly little discussion of the circumstances
under which states prefer custom over either treaties or soft law.
This Article uses an instrument choice analysis to offer a novel answer
to this question. We first identify the distinctive design features of custom.
227. Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime: UK Government Legal Position (Aug. 29,
2013), http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2013/images/08/29/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-re
gime-uk-government-legal-position.pdf.
228. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Speech on the U.S. Response to Syria, Aug. 31,
2013, http://www.npr.org/2013/08/31/217610904/transcript-president-obama-turns-to-con
gress-on-syria.
229. Force was not used in Syria in 2013 and the NATO bombing of Kosovo was con-
demned by some states, including Russia, China, and South Africa. Anne-Sophie Massa,
Does Humanitarian Intervention Serve Human Rights? The Case of Kosovo, 1:2 AMSTERDAM
L. F. 49 (2009), http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/view/63/120. Russia may well have
changed its position in light of the intervention in Crimea, which may, in turn, make humani-
tarian intervention less attractive to other countries fearful of Russia’s territorial ambitions.
Chris Borgen, Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Crimea: The Legal Rhetoric of Intervention, Recog-
nition, and Annexation, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 2, 2014, 8:04 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/04/
02/kosovo-south-ossetia-crimea-legal-rhetoric-intervention-recognition-annexation/.
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Unlike both treaties and soft law, custom as an ideal type is universal,
unwritten, and non-negotiated. These design features constrain states’ re-
course to CIL primarily to three domains, which we term all-states-benefit
custom, hegemonic custom, and normative custom. As a broad array of
examples illustrates, these three areas of cooperation are amenable to uni-
versally applicable international rules that arise without formal negotia-
tion over their content or memorialization of their terms.
We next consider the situations in which states will continue to choose
CIL in an era dominated by soft law and codified legal instruments. Al-
though commentators have argued that the demand for custom is declin-
ing, we contend that states will assert customary law arguments when they
prefer CIL’s design features or its substantive terms over those of existing
international agreements or nonbinding norms. We offer numerous exam-
ples to illustrate the continuing incentives for states to forge international
law through custom, while explaining why their ability to do so is limited
by custom’s domains. In the end, custom may be most likely to arise where
the three domains overlap—that is, where powerful states (or groups of
like-mined countries) advance new rules that respond to emerging global
problems or seek to overcome distributional differences by promoting
rules with compelling normative content.
